| Abstract |
This communication presents a simple methodology for analysis of fisheries management decision making process. For each type of decision, historical recorded informations for each actor are organized in tables which allow for mesuring distances between (i) initial legal prerogatives and acquired role, (ii) the messages delivered from a period to another. The crossed representations of actors in each others meetings are included in a second table which allow for analysis of the respective power and influence of each actor in the decision making process. This methodology is tested in the case of French Mediterranean fisheries, for two types of decisions: (i) management of the three miles coastal zone; (ii) access to loans and subsidies. It is shown that beyond scientific models and administrative decisions, fisheries management is an evolving adaptive negociation process among actors who have not an equal weight in a given period. An other result is the observation that the resource is not an actual stake, even if a proclaimed one, in the two case studies. [NOT CONTROLLED OCR] |
