

## Impact of increasing deployment of artificial floating objects on the spatial distribution of social fish species

Grégory Sempo<sup>1,\*</sup>, Laurent Dagorn<sup>2</sup>, Marianne Robert<sup>2,3</sup>, Jean-Louis Deneubourg<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Unit of Social Ecology, Université libre de Bruxelles CP231, Brussels, Belgium

<sup>2</sup> UMR 212, Ecosystèmes Marins Exploités, Centre de Recherche Halieutique Méditerranéenne et Tropicale (CRH), IRD, Sète, France

<sup>3</sup> Laboratoire de Technologie et Biologie Halieutiques, Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer (Ifremer), Lorient, France

\*: Corresponding author : Grégory Sempo, email address : [gsempo@ulb.ac.be](mailto:gsempo@ulb.ac.be)

### Abstract:

1. Approximately 300 pelagic fish species naturally aggregate around floating objects (FOBs) at the surface of the oceans. Currently, more than 50% of the world catch of tropical tuna comes from the industrial tuna fisheries around drifting FOBs. Greater understanding of the complex decision-making processes leading to this aggregation pattern and the impact of the massive release of artificial FOBs by fishermen on the spatial distribution and management of tuna is needed.
2. We analyse how the interplay between social (relationships between individuals) and non-social (responses to the environment) behaviours may affect the spatial distribution of a population in a multi-FOB environment. Taking the example of tropical tunas associating with FOBs and using differential equations and stochastic simulations, we examine how, when increasing the number of FOBs, fish aggregation dynamics and the distribution of the population among patches are affected by the population size, level of sociality and the natural retentive and/or attractive forces of FOBs on individual tuna.
3. Our model predicts that, depending on the species' level of sociality, fish will be scattered among FOBs or aggregated around a single FOB based on the number of FOBs deployed in a homogeneous oceanic region.
4. For social species, we demonstrated that the total fish catch is reduced with increasing FOBs number. Indeed, for each size of population, there are a number of FOBs minimizing the total population of fish associated with FOBs and another number of FOBs maximizing the total population of associated fish.
5. *Synthesis and applications.* In terms of fisheries management, the total catch volume is directly linked to the total number of floating objects (FOBs) for non-social species, and any limit on the number of sets would then result in a limit on the total catch. For social species (e.g. tuna), however, increasing the number of FOBs does not necessarily lead to an increase in the total catch, which is a non-intuitive result. Indeed, our model shows that, for specific values of the parameters, deploying a greater number of FOBs in the water (all other parameters being constant) does not necessarily help fishermen to catch more tuna, but does increase the level of fishing effort and bycatch.

**Keywords:** behaviour-based modelling ; Bycatch ; FAD ; FOB ; sustainable fishery ; tuna

74       **1. Introduction**

75   In the wild, the spatial distribution of individuals is most often patchy (Parrish &  
76   Hamner 1997), resulting from animals' reactions to biotic or abiotic factors, which are  
77   themselves often patchy, or from the interactions of conspecifics with each other, in  
78   the case of social species (Parrish & Hamner 1997; Parrish & Edelstein-Keshet 1999;  
79   Krause & Ruxton 2002; Stephens *et al.* 2002). These two processes structure  
80   scientific investigations of the spatial dynamics of wild animals; ecologists usually  
81   favour the importance of environmental stimuli, whereas ethologists often emphasize  
82   the relationships between conspecifics. However, these two approaches are non-  
83   exclusive.

84       Advances in the understanding of the spatial dynamics of fish illustrate this  
85   dichotomy. Ecologists generally try to interpret the observed distributions of fish as a  
86   result of interactions between fish and their environment (Pitcher 1992; Bertignac,  
87   Lehodey & Hampton 1998), while ethologists have extensively studied the schooling  
88   behaviour of fish, focusing on the mechanisms by which local interactions between  
89   members of the same school control the motion of the school (Viscido, Parrish &  
90   Grunbaum 2004; Hemelrijk & Hildenbrandt 2008; Couzin 2009; Capello *et al.* 2011).  
91   The functionality of aggregates that tropical tunas often form around floating objects  
92   (FOBs) were studied at short scales by ethologists while ecologists favour longer and  
93   larger scales. For years, it has been reported that tropical tunas (mainly skipjack,  
94   *Katsuwonus pelamis*, yellowfin, *Thunnus albacares*, and bigeye, *T. obesus*, tunas)  
95   naturally aggregate around objects floating at the surface of the ocean, such as logs,  
96   and debris, among others (Uda 1936; Hunter & Mitchell 1967), but the reasons that  
97   tunas associate with FOBs are still unknown. The first hypothesis to explain these

98 fish aggregations came from ecologists, who proposed that tunas were feeding on  
99 smaller fish that were associated with the FOBs (Kojima 1956; Bard, Stretta &  
100 Slepoukha 1985). Tunas, however, do not seem to generally feed on prey associated  
101 with drifting FOBs (Ménard *et al.* 2000). Later, ecologists advanced the indicator-log  
102 hypothesis (Hall 1992): natural FOBs (e.g., logs) could be indicators of productive  
103 areas, either because most of them originate in nutrient rich areas, such as river  
104 mouths, or because they aggregate in rich frontal zones offshore. In the late 1990s,  
105 ethologists suggested that tunas could associate with FOBs for social reasons  
106 (Dagorn & Freon 1999; Freon & Dagorn 2000). Floating objects could act as meeting  
107 points where individuals or small schools could gather to form larger schools,  
108 providing advantages to their members (Pitcher and Parrish 1993).

109         A better understanding of this associative behaviour is of increasing  
110 importance because this behaviour is intensively exploited by fishermen (largely on  
111 tropical tuna purse seine vessels) to facilitate their catch of tropical tunas. Initially,  
112 tropical tuna purse seine vessels began fishing for tunas that were aggregated  
113 around natural FOBs, such as logs. However, since the 1990s, fishermen have been  
114 using man-made floating objects, called fish aggregating devices (FADs), to facilitate  
115 the capture of these species. Globally, several thousands of FADs (usually rafts made  
116 of bamboo sticks that are equipped with satellite buoys that allow fishermen to  
117 relocate them) are regularly deployed by fishermen in the oceans (Moreno *et al.*  
118 2007; Dagorn *et al.* 2013). The use of FADs has largely contributed to an increase in  
119 the total catch of tuna: the catch of tropical tunas around drifting FADs by purse  
120 seine vessels has accounted for almost 50% of the tuna catch in the Pacific Ocean  
121 and 25% in other oceans (Fonteneau, Pallares & Pianet 2000; Dagorn *et al.* 2012b).

122 Several authors have modelled the dynamics of tuna aggregations around  
123 FOBs (Clark & Mangel 1979; Hilborn & Medley 1989; Dagorn, Bach & Josse 2000).  
124 Surprisingly, although tropical tunas are known to school, a form of social behaviour  
125 (Norris & Schilt 1988), all of these studies considered fish units that were  
126 independent, with no interaction between conspecifics (Robert *et al.* 2013). The fact  
127 that tunas school does not indicate, however, whether their social behaviour plays a  
128 key role in the aggregations that they form around FOBs. While recent studies (Soria  
129 *et al.* 2009; Capello *et al.* 2011) have described the role of social behaviour in the  
130 aggregations of small, pelagic fish species (e.g., the bigeye scad, *Selar*  
131 *crumenophthalmus*) around FADs, the influence of the social behaviour of tunas on  
132 the dynamics of their aggregations around FOBs is still poorly understood. Using a  
133 system of differential equations, we studied the patterns that were generated by fish  
134 interacting with each other while joining and leaving FOBs, as opposed to  
135 independent fish. In addition, due to the strong non-linearity of the model, we also  
136 performed stochastic simulations, where the random aspects of processes are  
137 automatically incorporated. This approach where all individuals behave independently  
138 in the limit of parameters values allows us to investigate the main effects arising  
139 from fluctuations. One of the main tasks requested by the Regional Fisheries  
140 Management Organizations (RFMO), who are in charge of the management of tuna  
141 fisheries, is an assessment of the consequences of the increasing number of FOBs in  
142 the ocean due to the release of large numbers of FADs. Consequently, we specifically  
143 examined the effects of an increase in the number of FOBs on the aggregation  
144 dynamics and distribution of tunas among FOBs when including or excluding social  
145 interactions from the model.

146 **2. The model**

147 The model consists of a system of  $p+1$  interconnected populations:  $x_i$  is the fraction  
148 of the total population ( $N$ ) around the FOB  $i$ , one of the  $p$  FOBs, and  $x_e$  is the fraction  
149 of the total population ( $N$ ) outside the FOBs (Fig. 1). All FOBs are identical (same  
150 design or same potential to attract/retain fish) and are located in a homogeneous  
151 environment. The population outside the FOBs is homogeneously distributed within  
152 this environment and the total fish population stays constant in the area (the  
153 recruitment and arrival of new fish in the population = mortality of fish). The  
154 differential equations describing the evolution of the fraction of the population  
155 around each FOB ( $x_i$ ) through time can be written as in Eq 1,a:

156 
$$\frac{dx_i}{dt} = R_i x_e - Q_i x_i \quad i = 1, \dots, p \quad (1, a)$$

157 
$$x_e + \sum_{i=1}^p x_i = 1 \quad (1, b)$$

158  $R_i$  ( $Q_i$ ) is the probability of joining (leaving) the FOB  $i$ . (Eq 2) and these probabilities  
159 depend on the interaction between the fishes. The model neglects the social  
160 interaction between fish outside the FOBs. It made the assumption that the  
161 interaction between fish implies that the greater the number of individuals around  
162 the FOB  $i$   $X_i (=Nx_i)$ , the greater the probability  $R_i$  of joining this FOB (Eq 2,a) and the  
163 lower the probability of leaving it. (Eq 2,b).

164 
$$R_i = \mu(1 + \beta N x_i) \quad (2, a)$$

165 
$$Q_i = \theta(1 + \varepsilon N x_i) \quad (2, b)$$

166  $\mu$  is the kinetic constant of joining the FOB  $i$  (when a FOB is "empty") and  $\theta$  is the  
167 maximal probability of leaving the FOB  $i$  per time unit.  $\beta$  and  $\varepsilon$  are the strengths of  
168 the social interaction and we assume, to simplify the analysis, that these strengths

169 are the same ( $\beta = \varepsilon$ ) for the both probabilities (joining and leaving). When  $\beta = 0$ , it  
 170 corresponds to the case of independent/asocial fish and  $R_i$  and  $Q_i$  are constant  
 171 ( $R_i = \mu$ ;  $Q_i = \theta$ ).

172 In biological terms, we assume that the social interaction is proportional to the  
 173 population size. The influence of a large number of individuals with a small  $\beta$  is  
 174 equivalent to the influence of a small population with a large  $\beta$ . Consequently, the  
 175 parameter  $b$  corresponds to large populations and/or large values of  $\beta$  (Eq 3).

$$176 \quad b = \beta N \quad (3)$$

177 Dividing Equation 1 by  $\mu$ , we define a new time  $\tau = \mu t$  and the ratio  $g = \frac{\theta}{\mu}$  and  
 178 we obtain:

$$179 \quad \frac{dx_i}{d\tau} = (1 + bx_i)x_e - \frac{gx_i}{1 + bx_i} \quad (4, a)$$

$$180 \quad 1 = x_e + \sum_{i=1}^p x_i \quad (4, b)$$

181

## 182 Monte Carlo simulations

183 To understand the main effects arising from the fluctuations in the non-linear process  
 184 of aggregation, we used Monte Carlo simulations including stochasticity in the  
 185 simulation. The simulations were based on the same mechanisms that were defined  
 186 in the differential system of equations (Eq. 4a,b). The following steps summarize our  
 187 analysis. (1) Initial conditions: the number of individuals around each FOB is fixed at  
 188 0, and the number outside the FOBs equals  $N$ ; (2) Decision process:  $p+1$  states are  
 189 possible for each individual around each FOB  $i$  ( $i=1, \dots, p$ ) and outside the FOBs. At  
 190 each time step ( $t$ ), the position of each individual is checked. Then, its probability of  
 191 leaving (joining) FOB  $i$  is given by  $Q_i$  ( $R_i$ ) (Eq. 2a,b). Its change of state at time  $t$

192 depends on the comparison between the calculated value  $Q_i (R_i)$  and a random  
193 number that is sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. If its value is  
194 less than or equal to  $Q_i(R_i)$ , the individual leaves (joins) FOB  $i$ .  
195 The probabilities  $Q_i$  and  $R_i$ , of moving are updated at each simulation step in relation  
196 to the number of individuals already present on site  $i$ . The process is repeated for a  
197 sufficient number of steps to reach the stationary state. Monte Carlo simulations are  
198 run 1000 times with a population of 1000 individuals during 1000 time steps. The  
199 simulation results allowed us to follow the progress towards the stationary state for  
200 FOB  $i$  in relation to time. The distributions of the numbers of individuals present in  
201 FOB  $i$  in relation to time and at the stationary state were calculated.

202

### 203 **3. Non-social system**

204 This model includes the scenario consisting of the absence of interaction between  
205 individuals ( $b = 0$ ). Trivially, as each individual settles randomly under one of the  $p$   
206 FOBs, the model has only one stationary symmetrical solution ( $x_1 = x_2 = \dots = x_p$ ). The  
207 populations around each FOB are identical and can be expressed as a function of  $g$   
208 and  $p$  (Eq. 5a,b). The total fraction of the population associated with the  $p$  FOBs is

$$209 \quad T = p * x_i.$$

$$210 \quad x_i = \frac{1}{g + p} \quad i = 1, \dots, p \quad (5, a)$$

$$211 \quad T = \frac{p}{g + p} \quad (5, b)$$

212

### 213 **4. Social systems**

#### 214 **a. The case of one FOB**

215

216 In the case of one FOB ( $p = 1$ ), at the stationary state Eq. 4a is

$$217 \quad \frac{dx}{dt} = 0 = (1 + bx)x_e - \frac{gx}{(1+bx)} \quad (6a)$$

$$218 \quad \text{or } (1 + bx)^2 x_e = gx = 0 \quad (6b)$$

$$219 \quad \text{with } x_e = 1 - x \quad (6c)$$

220 The solutions of this algebraic equation are the stationary states of Eq. 4. This  
221 equation has only one stationary solution, except for  $b > 8$  and  $g_- < g < g_+$ , where three  
222 stationary states exist: two stable and one unstable.

$$223 \quad g_{\pm} = (1 + bA_{\pm})^2 (A_{\pm}^{-1} - 1) \quad (7, a)$$

$$224 \quad A_{\pm} = 0.25 \pm (0.0625 - 0.5b^{-1})^{0.5} \quad (7, b)$$

225 Based on Eq. 7a,b, we show in Figure 2a the zones where the model has one or three  
226 stationary solutions.

227 Figure 2b, describing  $x_l$  as a function of  $g$  for 3 values of  $b$ , shows a classical  
228 hysteresis effect. For small values of  $g$  ( $g < g_-$ ), i.e., a strong tendency to associate  
229 with the FOB and/or a weak tendency to leave it, a large fraction of the population  
230 aggregates around the FOB. However, for large values of  $g$  ( $g > g_+$ ), a small fraction  
231 aggregates around the FOB. For  $g_- < g < g_+$  and  $b > 8$ , the system adopts one of the  
232 two stable states based on its history and random events (i.e., a large or small  
233 population around the FOB). The medium value is a threshold that is always  
234 unstable.

235 Similarly, Figure 2c, describing  $x_l$  as a function of  $b$  for 3 values of  $g$ , shows a similar  
236 hysteresis behaviour. Indeed, when increasing  $b$  (keeping  $g$  constant), the  
237 aggregated population around the FOB increases. For large values of  $g$ , we observe  
238 two stable states: a small population or a large one aggregated around the FOB.

239

240 **b. The case of two FOBs**

241 With two FOBs ( $p=2$ ), the model has two families of stationary states (Figure 3a,b).

242 The first family corresponds to an equal but small number of individuals around both

243 FOBs ( $x_1=x_2$ ). The solutions for the second family are asymmetrical states with

244 unequal numbers of individuals on each site ( $x_1>x_2$  or  $x_1<x_2$ ) (Figure 3a,b). This

245 result implies that one of the sites (FOB) is selected by the majority of the

246 population.

247 The detailed analysis of the solutions indicates that the symmetrical solution (equal

248 distribution of fish under the 2 FOBs) is stable for  $b<2$ , for  $2<b<6$  and  $g>4b-8$ , and

249 for for  $b>6$  and  $g>(1+0.5b)^{0.5}$  (Figure 3g,h).

250 In contrast, the system exhibits an asymmetric stable steady state ( $x_1>x_2$  or  $x_1<x_2$ )

251 when  $b>2$  and  $g<4b-8$ . In such a scenario, the selection of one FOB occurs through

252 amplification (Figure 3c,d).

253 Finally, one symmetrical and one asymmetrical solution are stable for  $b>6$  and  $4b-$

254  $8<g<(1+0.5b)^2$  (see Figure 3e,f). In this case, the initial condition (or randomness,

255 for the stochastic model) determines which steady state will be reached.

256 If we convert back into biologically meaningful variables, the stable stationary states

257 for this model for a large population ( $N$ ) and/or strong social interactions  $\beta$

258 demonstrate that for two FOBs, one FOB captures the whole population (Figure

259 3b,c). For small values of  $N$  and/or  $\beta$  or a large value of  $g$ , the population is equally

260 distributed between the two FOBs. The greater  $b$  (smaller  $g$ ), the greater is the

261 clustering asymmetry.

262

263 **c. Generalization to  $p$  FOBs**

264 For  $b > 0$  and  $p$  FOBs, the model has three zones of stationary states: one with a  
265 single, homogeneous, symmetrical steady state solution  $x_1 = x_2 = \dots = x_p$ , a second zone  
266 with an asymmetrical steady state solution  $x_1 > x_2 = \dots = x_p$  (or:  $x_2 > x_1 = x_3 = \dots = x_p$ , ... ;  
267  $x_p > x_1 = \dots = x_{p-1}$ ) and a zone where both solutions are stable and coexist (Figure  
268 4a,b).

269 For instance, for  $b=10$ ,  $g=20$  and an increasing  $p$ , the model shifts from an  
270 asymmetrical steady state to a symmetrical one via the bistability situation, where  
271 the symmetrical and asymmetrical solutions are stable. Indeed, for these values of  
272 the parameters  $b$  and  $g$ , we observed the asymmetrical solution  $x_1 > x_2$  (or  $x_1 < x_2$ ) for  
273  $p=2$  (Figure 3a), the bistability solution for  $p=10$  (Figure 4a) and the symmetrical  
274 solution for  $p=25$  (Figure 4b). This result highlights the tendency of fish to scatter  
275 due to an increasing number of FOBs, similar to what happens when there is no  
276 social interaction between fish (see the Discussion section).

277 As shown in Figure 4c,d, when the number of FOBs is small ( $< 10$ ) and  $g=10$ , one  
278 FOB is randomly selected (with a frequency of  $1/p$ ). When the steady state is  
279 reached, the population around this "winning" FOB  $x_i$  is high, nearly the entire  
280 population (Figure 5a). However, when the numbers of FOBs increases, both  
281 solutions are initially stable (asymmetrical and symmetrical solutions). For very large  
282 numbers of FOBs, we do not observe such selection, and the fish are equally  
283 distributed among all of the FOBs. For  $g \geq 34$ , the asymmetrical steady state  
284 disappears and only the symmetrical steady state exists. In each of these three cases  
285 ( $g=10$ ,  $g=34$ ,  $g=60$ ), not surprisingly, there is agreement between theoretical  
286 (Figure 4c,e,g) and simulated results (Figure 4d,f,h).

287

288 **5. Non-social vs. social systems: a case study**

289 The level of fish association to FOBs, as well as the asymmetrical or symmetrical  
290 pattern, can deeply influence the pattern of fishing effort. In this respect, we present  
291 an example of the variation in these parameters through a comparison of the  
292 influence of the number of FOBs ( $\rho$ ) on the total fraction of the population under  
293 FOBs ( $T$ , Figure 5a) and on the maximum fraction of the population observed under  
294 one FOB ( $x_{i\_max}$ , Figure 5b) for different values of  $b$  (inter-attraction between fishes  
295 and/or population size, Figure 5, see Eq. 3a).

296 For a small number of FOBs ( $\rho < 60$ ) in a non-social system ( $b=0$ ), the proportion of  
297 the population associated with FOBs ( $T$ ) increases with  $\rho$ . Individuals are equally  
298 distributed among FOBs and  $x_{i\_max}$  decreases with  $\rho$  (Figure 5a,b). In a social system,  
299 according to the value of  $b$ , if  $T$  is always higher than 75%, whatever the number of  
300 FOBs ( $\rho$ ), then the distribution of fish among FOBs switches abruptly at a critical  
301 value of  $\rho$ , from an asymmetrical state with a high  $x_{i\_max}$  corresponding to the  
302 selection of one FOB by the population, to a symmetrical state, where individuals are  
303 scattered between FOBs in identical small groups (Figure 5a,b).

304 However, for a large number of FOBs ( $\rho > 60$ ), for non-social ( $b=0$ ) or social fish  
305 ( $b=10$ ,  $b=20$ ), more than 80% of the individuals are equally distributed among  
306 FOBs, with the remaining 20% outside the FOBs. Consequently, the number of fish  
307 associated with each FOB is very small, and  $x_{i\_max} \simeq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\rho} x_i}{\rho}$ .

308

309 **Discussion**

310 The dynamics and distribution of tunas within an array of FOBs can be studied using

311 the theoretical ambit of metapopulation analyses and the spatial distribution of  
312 populations in multi-patch environments (Gotelli & Kelley 1993). In this study, we  
313 examined how aggregation dynamics are affected by the size of the fish population,  
314 the level of sociality between individuals, the total number of aggregation sites  
315 available (i.e., FOBs) and the natural retentive/attractive forces of FOBs on single  
316 individuals. We demonstrate that, depending on the values of these parameters, we  
317 could firstly predict that within a homogeneous oceanic region, the fraction of the  
318 population associated to FOBs can strongly varied and secondly, that the different  
319 FOBs will be equivalently occupied or that only one of them will be selected.  
320 Moreover, for some particular values of the parameters, the history of the system  
321 could lead to either of these two solutions (bistability).

322

### 323 Distribution of non-social fish among FOBs

324 Trivially, without social interactions ( $b = 0$ ), as individuals respond individually  
325 to a unique stimulus (i.e., the FOB), the fraction of the population associated with  
326 FOBs will slowly increase with the number of FOBs. In this context, aggregation  
327 corresponds to the summation of all individuals responses. This has been the  
328 common vision of tuna aggregations around FOBs. Moreover, if FOBs are equivalent  
329 in quality, the proportion of the population associated with each of them will be  
330 identical and inversely proportional to their number (Eq. 5). The total number of  
331 individuals associated with FOBs will only depend on  $g$ , the intrinsic retention power  
332 of FOBs. These results are in agreement with previous studies that have modelled  
333 the behaviour of fish around FOBs (Clark & Mangel 1979; Hilborn & Medley 1989;  
334 Dagorn *et al.* 2000).

335 In this case, the aggregation pattern of individuals is influenced more by the sum of  
336 individual responses (Fraenkel & Gunn 1961) than by a true collective decision  
337 process (Camazine 2001; Halloy *et al.* 2007; Sumpter 2010). If FOBs differ in quality  
338 (i.e., some naturally attract or retain more fish than others), a non-homogeneous  
339 situation exists. In such a case, the most favourable FOBs will aggregate a large  
340 percentage of the population, and each FOB will be characterized by its own value of  
341  $g$ . The FOB with the highest quality (i.e., the lowest value of  $g$ ) will aggregate the  
342 most individuals.

343

#### 344 Distribution of social fish among FOBs

345 When fish of the same species interact with each other (i.e., when the presence of  
346 conspecifics under a FOB influences the probability of reaching or staying around this  
347 FOB), our model and simulations show a different pattern. Indeed, for social species  
348 with a constant population size in an area with two or more FOBs of the same  
349 quality, the aggregative patterns predominantly arise from an amplification process  
350 that depends on the number of fish associated with each FOB ( $x_i$ ) and on the level of  
351 social interactions between fish and/or the population size ( $b$ , see Eq. 1a). This  
352 observation indicates that the greater is the number of fish around a FOB and/or the  
353 higher the inter-attraction between fish, the lower is the probability that a fish will  
354 leave it and/or the greater the probability that a fish will join it. Nonetheless, for  
355 high numbers of FOBs (Figure 4a), the scattering of the population among all FOBs  
356 precludes the amplification process from occurring, and the system shifts back to an  
357 equal distribution, which could be considered suboptimal in terms of fish exploitation  
358 if the number of fish around each FOB is too small (Auger *et al.* 2010). This complex

359 dynamic changes the common vision of the aggregation processes for non-social  
360 fish. Even for social species, an equal distribution of fish among FOBs can be  
361 obtained for some particular values of the parameters. Indeed, for a constant  
362 population of fish (the recruitment and arrival of new fish in the population =  
363 mortality of fish), we observe a shift from the selection of one FOB to an equal  
364 distribution of fish among all FOBs when the number of FOBs increases (Figure 6).  
365 This observation corresponds to the steady-state, so it may only be reached after an  
366 infinite length of time. For a small number of FOBs or a medium number associated  
367 with a large social interaction, the aggregation of fish under one FOB is the only one  
368 stable solution. Increasing the number of FOBs should, in general, lead to the vast  
369 majority of fish associating with all FOBs (Figure 6). This pattern of equal distribution  
370 is also obtained if the number of FOBs is medium or large and the social interactions  
371 between conspecifics are small (Figure 6). However, in this case, only a small  
372 proportion of the population is associated with FOBs. This pattern is due to the low  
373 probability of having enough individuals together around a FOB at the same time,  
374 which is required to initiate the amplification process that will lead to the selection of  
375 only one FOB.

376         In summary, it is noteworthy that for social species, the largest total number  
377 of individuals associated with FOBs can be reached in two different situations,  
378 depending on the size of the population and the number of FOBs. When few FOBs  
379 are present, there is selection, and a large proportion of the population is aggregated  
380 around one FOB. When there are many FOBs, there is an equal distribution of fish  
381 among all of the FOBs, each of them being occupied by a small number of  
382 individuals. Trivially, our model shows that for small or intermediate numbers of

383 FOBs, the population around a FOB is higher for social species, in comparison to non-  
384 social ones, or social situations with a scattered population among a large number of  
385 FOBs (Figure 5). Another important result is that for each size of population of fish  
386 (for social species, again), there is a number of FOBs that minimizes the total  
387 population of fish associated with FOBs, and another number of FOBs that maximizes  
388 the total population of associated fish.

389         What can we say in terms of management? The release of thousands of FADs  
390 into the ocean by purse seine vessels drastically increases the number of floating  
391 objects. Indeed, concerning the Indian Ocean, the number of FOBs has at least  
392 double since the introduction of FADs and in Somalia area for instance, the  
393 multiplication factor has reached as high as 20 or 40 (Dagorn *et al.* 2012b; Dagorn *et*  
394 *al.* 2013). In the Mozambique Channel and Chagos area, few FADs are deployed by  
395 fishers because the density of FOBs is naturally high i.e. they regularly drift in from  
396 both the eastern coast of Africa and Madagascar. The consequences of this increase  
397 differ between social and non-social species. Firstly, for social species only, above a  
398 critical number of FOBS, fish are less associated to FOBs. If implications for purse  
399 seine fishery are evident, this higher proportion of the population non-associated  
400 with FOBs could have ecological impact on social species by preventing them to  
401 access to potential benefits resulting from FOBs association (see Introduction  
402 section). Secondly, as already highlighted by previous studies (Auger *et al.* 2010), a  
403 very large number of FOBs in comparison to the local abundance of the fish  
404 population results in a small number of fish aggregated under each object, which  
405 confirms our theoretical results. This pattern is shared by both non-social and social  
406 models, under the specific conditions of a small inter-attraction between fish for the

407 latter. This situation would reduce the catch uncertainty (almost all FOBs have fish)  
408 but lead to an increase in the number of sets needed to reach a commercially viable  
409 level of total catch. Fishing on FOBs contributes to the catch of other species that  
410 naturally aggregate around these objects, called bycatch (Romanov 2002; Amandè *et*  
411 *al.* 2010). In the ecosystem approach to fisheries (Pikitch *et al.* 2004), such non-  
412 desirable catch should be minimized, knowing that some of those species are  
413 threatened (e.g., pelagic sharks Gilman (2011)). It appears that the total amount of  
414 bycatch is more dependent on the number of fishing sets (fishing effort) rather than  
415 the total amount of tuna caught, which led scientists to consider whether the fishery  
416 could reduce its impacts on the ecosystem by avoiding targeting small tuna schools  
417 around FOBs, i.e., catching the same total amount of tuna with a smaller number of  
418 sets (Dagorn *et al.* 2012a). Limiting the number of sets on FOBs is one of the  
419 possible means advanced to mitigate the impact of fishing on FOBs (Dagorn *et al.*  
420 2012b). Therefore, any increase in the number of fishing sets would counteract the  
421 reduction of bycatch. For non-social species, the total amount of catch of target  
422 species is directly linked to the total number of FOBs, and any limit on the number of  
423 sets (e.g., to limit bycatch) would then result in a limit on the total catch. For social  
424 species, however, increasing the number of FOBs does not necessarily lead to an  
425 increase in the total catch, a result that is not intuitive for many people, including  
426 fishermen. Our model shows that, for some particular values of the parameters,  
427 deploying a greater number of FADs in the water does not necessarily help fishermen  
428 catch more tuna, all other parameters being constant. However, it does increase the  
429 number of fishing sets, which certainly increases the bycatch (Dagorn *et al.* 2012a).  
430 Interestingly, the model properties and behaviours are unchanged if we increase the

431 grain by considering small schools of fish as the basic units instead of individual fish  
432 (e.g., in Dagorn *et al.* (2000)). This approach is more realistic, but would require  
433 modelling social interaction between fish not only when they are at FOBs but also  
434 when they are not associated with FOBs. Our model describes how the change in the  
435 number of FOBs, which can be adjusted by managing the number of FADs that are  
436 deployed by fishermen, could affect the spatial distribution of fish. Such spatial  
437 distribution could then impact some key behavioural and biological parameters of the  
438 species, in particular for social species. We consider that assessing the effects of the  
439 deployment of FADs on the distribution of fish within an array of FOBs is a key step  
440 in evaluating the impacts of FADs on the ecology of species, and our model could  
441 provide a framework to guide future experiments.

442 This study identified tropical tunas as the main species of interest because they are  
443 the target species of large-scale fisheries in all oceans. Fish aggregations, however,  
444 often comprise several fish species (Romanov 2002; Taquet *et al.* 2007; Amandè *et*  
445 *al.* 2010), and our model could easily be used to investigate the effects of increasing  
446 the number of FOBs on these other species, both social and non-social. Moreover,  
447 fish around a FOB could display some interspecific relationships (e.g., predator-prey  
448 interactions). Our model could be adapted to the dynamics of two interacting  
449 species, with one species influencing the presence or residence time of the other  
450 species around a FOB.

451         There is no doubt that our analysis and model have some weakness. Indeed,  
452 in our analysis, we mainly focused on the stationary solutions of the model in a  
453 constant environment. Second, the space is not explicitly modelled. However, a  
454 preliminary analysis of the dynamics of a spatial version of the model indicates that

455 our main conclusions remain valid, e.g., in terms of the influence of the number of  
456 FOBs and the size of the population of fish on the selection of a single FOB by the  
457 population.

458         This model highlights the need for experiments to characterize the role of the  
459 social behaviour of tunas (or other species) in their association with FOBs. Various  
460 types of dataset should be used to parameterize our model and to confront output to  
461 data. Each of these databases displays advantages and disadvantages, no one being  
462 perfect at this time. As a case study, we used observer's data on board commercial  
463 purse seine trip (Data Collection Framework – Obstuna database  
464 [http://sirs.agrocampus-ouest.fr/atlas\\_thoniers/](http://sirs.agrocampus-ouest.fr/atlas_thoniers/)). This choice was mainly driven by  
465 the fact that logbook do not provide information on "empty" FOBS, data are only  
466 available for fished FOBs. Even with observer database, fish biomass associated to  
467 FOBs is probably underestimated. Indeed, if this biomass does not reach a threshold  
468 determine by fishers FOBs are visited but not fished. Nevertheless, we can illustrate  
469 with these unsatisfactory data one of our social model predictions i.e. the decreasing  
470 pattern in the occupancy rate (e.g the number of fished FOBs divided by the total  
471 number of FOBs) when increasing the number of FOBs (Figure 7). To confirm such  
472 preliminary results, it would be useful to link them to local abundance of the  
473 population using total catches of tuna, including all fleet, available at the RFMOs  
474 level. To quantify more precisely the occupancy pattern of FOBs in a given area,  
475 another source of data, soon available to scientists, consist in the tuna biomass  
476 estimates provided by the satellite linked sonar buoys that fishermen recently  
477 deployed around their FOBs.

478 These preliminary results stress the need to collect accurate data on the number of

479 FOBs in the ocean and to better characterize fish behaviour at FOBs (Dagorn *et al.*  
480 2012a; Dagorn *et al.* 2012b). Here, we have shown the sensitivity of the aggregation  
481 patterns to the individual behaviour (probabilities of leaving and joining a FOB),  
482 population size and number of FOBs. However, we assert that the main challenges  
483 concerning the questions addressed in this paper and the model predictions are not  
484 theoretical, but experimental ones. Specifics experiments are required to provide  
485 data needed to calibrate the model parameter (especially  $g$  and  $b$ ). Recent  
486 experiments could bring important information to quantify the extent to which social  
487 interactions modulate the probability of leaving and reaching a FOBs or a network of  
488 FOBs (Robert *et al.* 2013).

489

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496

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611  
612

613 Figure 1. Model of aggregation process.

614

615 Figure 2. Diagrams of solutions For 1 FOB. (a) Space parameters : number of solutions as a  
616 function of the parameters  $g$  and  $b$  (b) Fraction of the total number of individuals around  
617 the FOB ( $x_1$ ) in relation to  $g$  for  $b=5$ ,  $b=10$ , and  $b=20$ . Solid lines: stable solutions; dashed  
618 lines: unstable solutions. (c) Fraction of the total number of individuals around the FOB ( $x_1$ )  
619 in relation to  $b$  for  $g=10$ ,  $g=50$ , and  $g=100$ . Solid lines: stable solutions; dashed lines: unstable  
620 solutions.

621

622 Figure 3. Diagrams of solutions for 2 FOBs. (a) Space parameters: number of solutions as a  
623 function of the parameters  $g$  and  $b$  (b) Fraction of the total population around the FOBs as a  
624 function of  $g$  for a network of 2 FOBs. Stochastic simulation: for  $b=10$  and 2 FOBs:  
625 Distribution of experiments according to the fraction of the total population associated with  
626 the FOB 1 for  $g=10$  (c), 34 (e) and 60 (g). Case study of the stochastic simulation of the time  
627 evolution of the fraction of the total population associated to each FOBs For  $g=10$  (d), 34 (f)  
628 and 60 (h).

629

630 Figure 4. Diagrams of solutions for  $p$  FOBs. Space parameters: number of solutions as a  
631 function of the parameters  $g$  and  $b$  for  $p=10$  (a) and  $p=25$  (b) (c) Fraction of the total  
632 population around the FOBs ( $b=10$ ) in relation to  $p$  for  $g=10$  (c),  $g=34$  (e), and  $g=60$  (g).  
633 Stochastic simulation: mean fraction of the simulated total population around the FOBs  
634 ( $b=10$ ) in relation to  $p$  for  $g=10$  (d),  $g=34$  (f), and  $g=60$  (h).

635

636 Figure 5. Stochastic simulation. For  $b=0$ ,  $b=10$  and  $b=20$  and a constant  $g=10$  (a) Influence of  
637 the number of FOBs ( $p$ ) on the maximum number of individuals observed under one FOB  
638 ( $X_{i_{max}}$ ), (b) Influence of the number of FOB ( $p$ ) on the total number of individuals under  
639 FOBs ( $T$ ).

640

641 Figure 6. Diagram synthetizing the influence of the number of FOBs ( $p$ ) and the social  
642 interaction ( $b$ ) on the spatial pattern of fish (aggregation of homogeneous distribution).


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644 Figure 7. Boxplot of the proportion of fished FOBs as a function of the number of observed  
645 FOBs. Observer's data in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean between January 2006 and august  
646 2010 (Obstuna database: [http://sirs.agrocampus-ouest.fr/atlas\\_thoniers](http://sirs.agrocampus-ouest.fr/atlas_thoniers)). Number of FOBs  
647 observed was calculated on a  $2^\circ$  squared and on a monthly base.




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
### Model of aggregation processes




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651 Fig.1  
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
653 Fig.2  
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
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656 Fig.3




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658 Fig.4



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663 Fig.6  
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 666 Fig.7  
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