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## **Improving early detection of exotic or emergent oyster diseases in France: identifying factors associated with shellfish farmer reporting behaviour of oyster mortality**

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### **Abstract:**

Farmers' vigilance is essential for the detection of epidemics, including potential emerging diseases, in marine shellfish. A field study was conducted to investigate oyster farmers' reporting practices and behaviour, and to identify factors influencing the reporting process of oyster mortality, with the ultimate aim of improving early detection of unexplained oyster mortality outbreaks.

A retrospective case-control study of oyster farmers from Charente-Maritime (France) was designed, based on interviews with 27 non-reporting and 89 reporting farmers, further split into 40 formerly-reporting and 49 currently-reporting farmers. Information about farmer and farm characteristics, farming practices, farm health history and related financial compensation on the farm, knowledge of the mortality reporting system and reporting behaviour was collected. Sampling design was considered in the calculations and farmers' reporting behaviour was modelled using an ordinal logistic regression (continuation-ratio model).

Notification procedures were fairly well known among farmers and the reporting system was well accepted overall. Nevertheless, a lack of awareness of the aims of the reporting system was revealed, which contributed to late reporting. Factors identified as driving a farmer's decision to report oyster mortality concerned their lack of awareness of mortality reporting (production type, farm size, location of the production cycle, accessibility of the leasing grounds) and willingness to report (possibility and extent of financial compensation, a feeling of not being involved, whether it was first year of reporting). Overall classification performance of the model built in this study was 64%. In particular, financial compensation for oyster production losses appeared to be a clear incentive for reporting, but was countered by a habituation effect combined with a lack of awareness of the aims of the reporting system: oyster farmers looking for benefits for themselves in reporting, rather than early detection of a disease outbreak.

Both economic compensation and the farmers' non-economic values and perceptions should be considered to improve oyster farmers' reporting compliance and sustainability of the reporting system. Education and participatory approaches could help to change these attitudes and thus improve oyster farmers' compliance with reporting duties, resulting in improved early detection of epidemics and emerging or exotic oyster diseases.

### **Highlights**

► Oyster farmers' reporting practices and behaviour towards oyster mortality were investigated. ► Notification procedures were fairly well known. ► A lack of awareness of the aims of the reporting system was revealed, contributing to late reporting. ► Both economic and non-economic factors were identified as drivers for farmer reporting decision.

**Keywords** : Case-control study ; Ordinal logistic regression ; Surveillance ; Notification ; Shellfish diseases

62

63 **1. Introduction**

64

65 In France, the current surveillance system for marine mollusc health is mainly based on the  
66 observation of any increased shellfish mortality by shellfish farmers and its immediate  
67 mandatory notification to the local competent authority (European Union, 2006; French  
68 Ministry of Agriculture, 2008). But, although immediate notification of any observed  
69 mortality event is mandatory, the current definition of an increased shellfish mortality does  
70 not include objective criteria and mortality estimation is not straightforward: “*increased*  
71 *mortality’ means unexplained mortalities significantly above the level of what is considered to*  
72 *be normal for the [...] mollusc farming area in question under the prevailing conditions.*  
73 *What is considered to be increased mortality would be decided in cooperation between the*  
74 *farmer and the competent authority” (European Union, 2006). Shellfish farmers have to  
75 complete a standardized notification sheet (French Ministry of Agriculture, 2010a). This  
76 mandatory document is a pre-tabulated paper form, which is filled in (usually by hand-  
77 writing) by the farmer. This form has to be immediately transmitted to the local competent  
78 authority. The national mollusc disease surveillance network (Repamo) then becomes  
79 involved, for anamnesis and laboratory diagnosis based on biological samples (Dufour and  
80 Hendrickx, 2009).*

81 This system notably aims to early detect the appearance of any exotic or emerging pathogen  
82 in the territorial waters. Indeed, as diseased shellfish seldom show symptoms, any  
83 unexplained mortality is a potential indicator for pathogen introduction or emergence. This  
84 was well illustrated in 2008, when mortality notification data represented one of the rare data  
85 sources that both acted as an alert and described the extent of the mass mortality outbreaks  
86 which occurred in the spat of Pacific oyster, *Crassostrea gigas* (Miossec et al., 2009),

87 associated with the detection of a newly described genotype ( $\mu$ Var) of the Ostreid herpesvirus  
88 (OsHV-1) (European Food Safety Agency, 2010; Segarra et al., 2010). Unfortunately, this  
89 infection has become endemic (Lupo et al., 2011b), showing that control of the spread of this  
90 emerging pathogen has failed.

91 Early detection of pathogen introduction or emergence in shellfish is crucial, as openness and  
92 connectivity of marine systems enable rapid disease spread (McCallum et al., 2004) and  
93 successful control of disease is very unlikely once established in shellfish populations (Lupo  
94 et al., 2012a). The use of drugs is not possible; therapeutic levels cannot be obtained  
95 economically or without unacceptable environmental impacts. Vaccination cannot be used  
96 because shellfish lack a true adaptive immune system, relying totally on their innate immune  
97 system to overcome diseases (Renault, 2009). However, there exists a window of opportunity  
98 to limit spread, which would need to be done mainly by restricting shellfish movements  
99 (European Union, 2006), and possibly by eliminating a pathogen early in an epidemic.

100

101 Like in any animal health surveillance system relying on the reporting of suspicious events,  
102 shellfish farmers are the best placed to inquire into and notify authorities of any suspicion of  
103 disease in the field (Dufour and Hendrickx, 2009). Their active involvement in this  
104 surveillance system is fundamental to make it effective, i.e. sensitive and timely to provide  
105 early alerts. However, a recent study has shown that participation of French oyster farmers in  
106 the mortality notification system was not sustained over the 2007–2010 time period (Lupo et  
107 al., 2012b). Since 2010, financial incentives have been implemented, with mortality  
108 notification becoming mandatory to qualify for financial compensation (French Ministry of  
109 Agriculture, 2010b). It is necessary to identify the incentives and barriers to the farmers'  
110 participation in the surveillance system in order to design an improved means of reporting  
111 (World Bank, 2010) and to help sustain farmers' motivation to report.

112

113 A few studies have investigated the reasons for farmer under-reporting diseases in livestock  
114 (Limon et al., 2013), cattle (Palmer, 2009; Bronner et al., 2013a; Bronner et al., 2013b), sheep  
115 (Hopp et al., 2007), swine (Elbers et al., 2010a) and poultry (Elbers et al., 2010b) but, to our  
116 knowledge, this has never been investigated in shellfish farming. Thus, a study was conducted  
117 to investigate farmers' reporting practices and behaviour, and to identify factors influencing  
118 the reporting process of oyster mortality, with the ultimate aim of improving early detection  
119 of unexplained oyster mortality outbreaks.

120

121 **2. Material and methods**122 *2.1. Study design and population*

123 The study was designed as a retrospective case-control study of oyster farmers from  
124 Charente-Maritime (France), using the oyster farmer as the epidemiological unit. Charente-  
125 Maritime is the main production region of Pacific oysters, *Crassostrea gigas*, in France, home  
126 to one third of all French oyster farms (Agreste, 2005). In particular, this is the main area of  
127 spat collection, supplying all the other regions with spat (Buestel et al., 2009). The study was  
128 conducted from March to December 2012.

129

130 Control farmers were randomly selected (by lottery using computer generated pseudo-random  
131 numbers) from the list of the oyster farmers who had notified authorities of at least one  
132 mortality event on their oyster production between January 2007 and December 2011 in  
133 Charente-Maritime. This list was provided by the Departmental direction for territories and  
134 sea of Charente-Maritime (i.e. the local competent authority).

135

136 Case farmers were randomly selected from the list of oyster farmers licensed for leasing  
137 grounds, run by the Departmental direction for territories and sea of Charente-Maritime, who  
138 had not notified authorities of any oyster mortality event between January 2007 and  
139 December 2011.

140

141 Only the oyster farmers farming the oyster species *C. gigas*, who were active at the time of  
142 the study and having a farm located in Charente-Maritime were considered in this study.  
143 Other shellfish farmers and oyster farmers located in other regions with leasing grounds in  
144 Charente-Maritime were excluded.

145

146 2.2. *Sample size*

147 A sample size of 36 cases and 108 controls was calculated to provide a 95% level of  
148 confidence for detecting an odds ratio of 3 with 80% statistical power, assuming a 1:3 ratio of  
149 case to control farmers and a random notification process, i.e. a 50% probability of reporting  
150 observed oyster mortality. Sample size was increased by 15% to account for non-participation  
151 rate observed in previous and recent studies conducted in the same population (Lupo et al.,  
152 2011a; Carlier et al., 2013), leading to a total of 41 cases and 124 controls, out of 165 and 703  
153 eligible oyster farmers, respectively.

154

155 2.3. *Data collection*

156 Each selected farmer was sent a personally addressed letter to explain the survey objective  
157 and to tell them that they would receive a telephone call. An appointment was made during  
158 the telephone call to collect data. The farmer was informed about the data collection  
159 procedure, which would be based on a personal face-to-face interview that would take about  
160 45 minutes to complete. The farmers who refused to take part were asked the reason why and  
161 were compared with those farmers who agreed to participate.

162 These interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire (Table 1) that was piloted with  
163 three oyster farmers and modified according to the feedback. The questionnaire (available in  
164 supplementary file) contained 28 questions (54% closed, 7% semi-closed and 39% open-  
165 ended) that collected data related to socio-demographics, farm characteristics, farming  
166 practices, health history on the farm since 2007, knowledge of the oyster mortality reporting  
167 system and reporting behaviour. For control farmers, 12 additional questions (4 closed, 4  
168 semi-closed and 4 open-ended) collected data related to their reporting practices and attitudes.

169 The previously trained, experienced interviewers (AOA and CL) conducted the pilot

170 interviews together to ensure standardization in interview method and all questions were  
171 clarified beforehand to reduce information bias due to the interviewer. Questions were asked  
172 exactly as stated in the questionnaire and only non-directive guidance was given. All the  
173 interviews were recorded with the oyster farmer's authorisation.

174

175 Information on the leasing grounds (location, accessibility measured by the tide coefficient,  
176 number per farm and area per farm) was obtained from the public maritime area register, run  
177 by the Departmental direction for territories and sea of Charente-Maritime.

178

179 All data were entered by the two interviewers into a purpose built Microsoft® Access 2007  
180 database.

181

## 182 *2.4. Statistical data analysis*

183 All statistical analyses were conducted using SAS statistical software (version 9.3 © 2002-  
184 2010, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA).

185

### 186 *2.4.1. Outcome variable*

187 As the reporting behaviour of control farmers appeared to be heterogeneous, reporting farmers  
188 were split into two subgroups. A three-category ordered outcome variable was thus created  
189 based on the oyster farmers' reporting practices of oyster mortality: Reporting, Formerly-  
190 reporting and Non-reporting farmers. Reporting farmers were defined as farmers who had  
191 always reported massive mortality outbreaks since 2008. Formerly-reporting farmers were  
192 defined as farmers who used to report observed mortality events before 2010 but who had  
193 stopped reporting since. Non-reporting farmers were defined as farmers who observed but did  
194 not report any oyster mortality. Farmers who observed no oyster mortality whether mortality



195 occurred or not were excluded from the analysis (N=4).

196

#### 197 *2.4.2. Explanatory variables*

198 The notification process falls into three steps: occurrence of the event, its detection and its  
199 notification by the farmer. Because the objective of the present study was to evaluate the  
200 potential for improvement to incite oyster farmers to report, only the detection and  
201 notification steps were studied.

202

203 A total of 50 potential explanatory variables were considered in this study.

204 Qualitative data from the open-ended questions were analysed using content analysis  
205 (Franzosi, 2004) to identify thematic categories. For this purpose, all the interviews were  
206 transcribed on a dedicated thematic grid and anonymised. Each respondent's transcripts were  
207 read by both interviewers to ensure familiarity with the raw data and to identify key themes  
208 and issues. An interpretative coding of the responses was used, which was driven by the data  
209 itself and not by pre-determined categories (Franzosi, 2004). Responses were then grouped  
210 together by thematic categories. The first transcripts to be analysed were coded meticulously  
211 and subsequent interviews were coded according to the thematic categories established by the  
212 initial coding process, incorporating any additional emerging issues. Saturation was reached  
213 when no new issues were raised and previously-raised issues being repeated.

214 All explanatory variables were binary or ordinal apart from six which were continuous  
215 quantitative, namely: age, surface area and number of leasing grounds, average tide  
216 coefficient of leasing grounds, proportions of leasing grounds accessible even at neap and  
217 only at strong tide.

218

219 Potential explanatory variables were described in terms of frequency distribution (qualitative

220 data) or median and range (quantitative data), classified by the outcome variable.

221

### 222 2.4.3. Outcome modelling

223 An ordinal logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate factors associated with  
 224 the three previously defined farmer reporting behaviours, using a continuation-ratio model  
 225 (Fienberg, 1980; Dohoo et al., 2009). This model predicts (1) the probability of a non-  
 226 reporting behaviour, using Equation 1, and (2) the conditional probability of a formerly-  
 227 reporting behaviour, given that the farmer had already reported at least once, using Equation  
 228 2, and can be written as follows:

$$229 \quad \log \frac{\pi_1(x_i)}{\pi_2(x_i) + \pi_3(x_i)} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_i \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

$$230 \quad \log \frac{\pi_2(x_i)}{\pi_3(x_i)} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 x_i \quad (\text{Equation 2})$$

231 where  $x_i$  designates the explanatory variables,  $\{\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3\}$  are the probabilities for the  
 232 realization of each of the reporting behaviour category, respectively non-reporting, formerly-  
 233 reporting and reporting behaviour, with the constraint  $\pi_1 + \pi_2 + \pi_3 = 1$ .

234 The effect of an explanatory variable is supposed to be heterogeneous across the reporting  
 235 behaviour category transitions . An unconstrained continuation-ratio model was fitted (Cole  
 236 and Ananth, 2001), producing two sets of coefficients ( $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ ) for the explanatory variables  
 237 being investigated, one set for each of the outcome categories above the baseline, i.e. the  
 238 formerly-reporting versus the Reporting farmer categories, and non-reporting versus the  
 239 merged categories formerly-reporting and Reporting farmers. The exponentiated regression  
 240 coefficients ( $e^\beta$ ) produced odds ratio (OR) as a measure of effect (Dohoo et al., 2009).

241

242 As sampling design was outcome-driven, the probability of a farmer being sampled was not  
 243 the same for all reporting behaviour categories, leading to potentially biased results

244 (Greenland, 1994; Scott et al., 1997). The sampling design was therefore taken into account in  
245 the analysis (SURVEYLOGISTIC procedure, SAS Institute Inc.). A sampling weight was  
246 applied to each observed farmer: the contribution of an observation to the calculation was  
247 weighted by the inverse of the probability of it being observed (Ciol et al., 2006).

248 As sampling rates were not small enough to ignore, a finite population correction factor was  
249 included in the analysis to provide valid variance estimates.

250

251 The dataset was suitably restructured to allow the fitting of two separate binary logistic  
252 regressions, from which estimates of the continuation-ratio model were derived (Armstrong  
253 and Sloan, 1989). A similar variable selection method was applied in both models.

254 In an initial screening step, univariate ordinal logistic regression analyses were carried out  
255 separately for each explanatory variable.

256 Continuous quantitative variables were categorised according to their quartile values to  
257 explore the shape of their relationship with the outcome variable. When the linearity  
258 assumption was violated, their best-fitting form was determined by merging logical categories  
259 or categories that reflected changes in regression estimates.

260 Based on the Wald's type 3 test, p-value for variable selection and entry into the multivariate  
261 model was 0.25. Any strong collinearity ( $\chi^2$  test for nominal variables,  $p < 0.05$ ) between  
262 explanatory variables was checked, and the most significant variable or the most biologically  
263 related to the outcome variable was chosen.

264 The retained variables, with  $< 5\%$  missing values, were then introduced into a multivariate  
265 ordinal logistic regression model fitted with a manual backward-selection procedure (Wald's  
266 test,  $p < 0.05$ ). Confounding was assessed by checking that the discarded variables induced  
267  $< 20\%$  changes in the coefficients of the other variables. Biologically plausible two-way  
268 interactions of the explanatory variables in the final model were tested and retained if

269 significant ( $p < 0.05$ ).

270

#### 271 2.4.4. Model evaluation

272 An overall goodness-of-fit statistic pertaining to the simultaneous fitting of the two models  
273 was provided by the sum of the two separate deviance statistics (Agresti, 2002), with a non-  
274 significant p-value, suggesting a good fitting of the model.

275

276 Individual goodness-of-fit, i.e. predictive ability of the model, was assessed by computing its  
277 overall classification performance. This was evaluated by comparing the predicted reporting  
278 behaviour category (identified as the category with the highest predicted probability for each  
279 farmer) with the actual reporting behaviour category. Predicted probabilities of the occurrence  
280 of each outcome category were calculated, accounting for the sampling design, to allow a  
281 direct interpretation.

282

283 **3. Results**284 *3.1. Samples description*

285 Due to logistical constraints, only 139 farmers were effectively contacted, of which 31 cases  
286 and 89 controls agreed to participate in the study, representing participation rates of 84% and  
287 86%, respectively. Six cases and 13 controls refused a visit, mainly declaring lack of time.  
288 Neither farmer (gender, age) nor farm characteristics (geographical location, size, number of  
289 leasing grounds, location of the production cycle) differed significantly according to the  
290 farmer participation status.

291 Four case farmers did not experience any mortality event in their oyster production during the  
292 2007–2011 period, and were consequently excluded. Of the 89 reporting farmers, 55% had  
293 always reported the observed mortality events since 2008 and 45% used to report mortality  
294 events but had stopped reporting since 2010, when mortality notification became related to  
295 eligibility for the financial compensation. Thus, the results that follow refer to 27 non-  
296 reporting, 40 formerly-reporting and to 49 reporting farmers.

297

298 The characteristics of the 116 oyster farmers interviewed are summarized in Table 2. Most of  
299 these farmers were male and older than 40. The farms included in the samples were mostly  
300 located in the south of the production area and specialized in oyster rearing, with activities  
301 related to all production stages. Most farmers had detected mortality events between 2007  
302 and 2011 and the control farmers had first reported a mortality event mainly in 2007 or 2008  
303 (Table 2).

304

305 *3.2. Description of farmer's practices and perceptions*306 *3.2.1. Description of an oyster mortality event according to the farmers*

307 Most farmers described a mortality event by qualitative criteria involving different senses,  
308 such as nauseating odour, observation of empty shells or a specific noise when manipulating  
309 the oyster bags (Table 2).

310

311 Counting dead oysters to estimate a mortality rate was a common practice and a threshold  
312 value was often given to distinguish an “abnormal” mortality event from a usual one,  
313 although this varied greatly from one farmer to another.

314

### 315 *3.2.2. Oyster mortality reporting practices*

316 In total, 81 control farmers provided responses about their reporting practices. No statistically  
317 significant differences were observed between responses of formerly-reporting and reporting  
318 farmers.

319 The reporting process of an oyster mortality event was divided into two steps for 70% of  
320 control farmers: they first report the event and then they formally notify it. They were 59% to  
321 report to their colleagues, 35% to the Departmental direction for territories and sea and 21%  
322 to the local farmer’s representatives. Other structures such as Ifremer, collective farmers’  
323 society, technical institutes or accountants were also cited, but by less than 5% of interviewed  
324 farmers. Farmers mainly report in person (70%), by phone (32%), or by fax (7%).

325 Notification procedures were fairly well-known by the reporters. They were 60% (47/80) to  
326 obtain the notification sheet from the local farmer representatives, 34% from the local  
327 competent authority and 5% from their accountant. Most of them (96%; 78/81) transmitted  
328 the sheet to the local competent authority and 6% to the local farmer representatives. The  
329 notification sheet was mainly delivered to addressee in person (60%; 46/80), by postal mail  
330 (89%), by fax (16%) or by email (1%).

331 Only 5% (4/80) of the reporters transmitted the notification sheet the day or the following day

332 after the mortality detection, 18% did this during the following week and 15% during the  
333 following month. Half of them (54%) waited for the '*end of the mortality season*', i.e. the end  
334 of the summer. The remainders (9%) waited until the 31<sup>st</sup> December of the year, which has  
335 been the deadline to submit application files for financial compensation since 2010.

336

### 337 3.2.3. *Perceptions of the notification system*

338 Most control farmers (70%; 55/79) considered that reporting oyster mortality events was  
339 'very simple' or 'fairly simple'. However, even if they were 83% (52/63) to be generally  
340 satisfied with the reporting system, 63% (50/79) of them commented on its weaknesses:  
341 onerous data retrieval (56%), complex procedures (46%), time consuming procedures (30%),  
342 impractical data transfer (10%), and lack of guidance for filling in the notification sheet (6%).

343

344 About 85% (72/85) of control farmers felt 'very poorly satisfied' or 'poorly satisfied' with the  
345 information feedback about the mortality notification system; the reasons they cited were:  
346 absence of feedback (61%), too little information received (26%), feedback disparity between  
347 the farmers (10%), non-transparency (4%), lack of clarity and understanding of received  
348 information (3%).

349

350 The aim of the mortality reporting system of early warning was unclear to oyster farmers, in  
351 all the reporting behaviour categories. Only 3% (3/88) of the control farmers and none of the  
352 27 case farmers knew that reporting an oyster mortality event was mandatory. The aims cited  
353 by the control farmers were: descriptive purpose (50%) and improvement of the  
354 understanding of the mortality phenomenon (45%), obtaining financial compensation (45%),  
355 sanitary surveillance (6%), and warning alert onset (3%). The case farmers cited: descriptive  
356 purpose (68%) and improvement of the understanding of the mortality phenomenon (58%),

357 and obtaining financial compensation (35%).

358 *“Understanding the how and the why, even if we can’t do anything about it”-Case #71*

359 Finally, 9% of control and 10% of case farmers believed that this system was useless:

360 *“This can’t avoid the problem, knowing what is going on won’t change anything”-Control*

361 *#19*

362

#### 363 3.2.4. Reasons for under-reporting

364 The main reasons for non-reporting an oyster mortality event stated by the case farmers were:

365 the amounts of financial compensation were insufficient (39%; 9/23) or that mortality impact

366 on their production was not sufficient enough to be reported (30%). Some of them made the

367 comment *“It’s not worth it”* or *“This can’t avoid the problem, knowing what is going on*

368 *won’t change anything”-Control #19*

369

370 Another 13% believed that the mortality reporting system only concerned oyster spat. As their

371 activity did not include this production stage, they did not feel involved in the system. They

372 were 22% to evoke the complexity of the reporting procedures, which made them reluctant to

373 report. Other reasons, such as feeling of state handouts, system rejection, negligence or

374 missing information about the reporting process were stated by less than 10% of the case

375 farmers.

376

377 Among the 89 control farmers, 40 were former reporters, i.e. they had stopped reporting the

378 oyster mortality events they observed since 2010. Only 17 of them provided direct responses

379 to the question of the reasons to stop reporting: 47% of them believed that the amounts of

380 financial compensation were insufficient, 24% evoked the time given to reporting, 24% no

381 longer felt involved because of pending retirement, 12% mentioned the complexity of the



382 system, 12% referred to the decreasing mortality impact on their production in comparison  
383 with previous years, 6% felt discouraged because of the endemic situation, and 6% rejected  
384 the whole system.

385

### 386 *3.3. Factors associated with the farmer reporting behaviour*

387 A total of 29 variables were associated ( $p < 0.25$ ) with farmer reporting behaviour in the  
388 univariate analysis, of which 13 were included in both models (Table 3). Six of these 29  
389 variables were related to farm characteristics, 12 were related to husbandry and mortality  
390 detection practices, six were related to the oyster mortality and economic history of the farm,  
391 two were related to mortality reporting history and three were related to farmer opinions of  
392 the reporting system.

393

394 Four explanatory variables were associated with farmer reporting behaviour in each of the  
395 final models (Table 4). Compared with the combined categories of formerly or currently  
396 reporting farmers, non-reporting farmers most often had smaller farms, with less than 20  
397 leasing grounds in Charente-Maritime, and a production cycle based in Charente-Maritime  
398 but also involving other departments. They were more likely to produce only diploid oysters  
399 and had usually not received financial compensation in the years 2007–2009, when all the  
400 other variables are held constant. Compared with reporting farmers, former reporters most  
401 often had a smaller proportion of leasing grounds that were easily accessible, made their first  
402 mortality notification in 2008, thought more often that amount of financial compensation was  
403 insufficient and usually did not feel involved in the notification system, when all the other  
404 variables are held constant. There were neither confounding effects nor interactions for any of  
405 the variables in either of the final models.

406 The individual effects of the risk factors are illustrated in Figure 1, where the predicted

407 probabilities are shown stratified by the levels of the risk factors

408 The overall goodness-of-fit statistic suggested that the overall model fitted the observed data

409 well. When farmers were allocated to expected reporting behaviour categories according to

410 predicted probability, the overall correct classification probability of the model was 64%

411 (74/115), with 48% of non-reporting, 75% of formerly-reporting and 65% of reporting

412 farmers correctly predicted (Table 5).

413

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#### 413 **4. Discussion**

414 To our knowledge, this study is the first to provide insights about oyster farmers' reporting  
415 practices and behaviour towards oyster mortality events, and the influencing factors.

416

##### 417 *4.1. Study validity*

418 Random sampling ensured data representativity in both case and control samples. Satisfactory  
419 survey participation rates were achieved and non-respondents did not systematically differ  
420 from respondents, limiting selection bias. Thus, we can confidently say that the results of this  
421 study reflected farmers' reporting behaviour concerning oyster mortality in Charente-  
422 Maritime during the study period. However, although Charente-Maritime accounts for one  
423 third of the French oyster farms (Agreste, 2005), the present results could not be extended to  
424 the whole French oyster farming industry. Indeed, Charente-Maritime is the traditional region  
425 for oyster farming and, with Arcachon basin, is a principal site for spat collection in France  
426 (Agreste, 2005). As mortality outbreaks have mostly occurred in spat since 2008 (European  
427 Food Safety Agency, 2010; Segarra et al., 2010), the farmer reporting behaviour towards spat  
428 mortality may differ in other oyster farming regions that do not produce their own spat.

429

430 The well-known recommendations to ensure good data collection (Martin et al., 1987) were  
431 applied to minimize information bias. The questionnaire was standardized and pilot versions  
432 were tested before the study. Due to the declarative nature of the potential explanatory  
433 variables, a face-to-face approach was specifically chosen to increase cooperation,  
434 consistency and reliability of responses as well as data completeness.

435

436 The outcome status was based on the yearly official notification databases provided by the  
437 local competent authority. During the interview, we further confirmed this status by checking

438 whether farmers recalled having reported at least one mortality event each year during the  
439 study period. Farmers with leasing grounds in other departments could have reported  
440 observed oyster mortality to the local competent authority of the other departments, leading to  
441 a misclassification bias, as reporters were identified through the local databases in the absence  
442 of a national one. However, none of the sampled farmers mentioned this possibility during the  
443 interviews. Therefore, misclassification bias is unlikely to have had a significant influence on  
444 the observed results.

445

446 In this study, the outcome variables modelled different levels of farmer reporting compliance  
447 from more to less compliant with the mandatory reporting of oyster mortality. Thus, the  
448 continuation-ratio model was a reasonable starting formulation, as it is designed for situations  
449 in which the ordered categories represent a longitudinal progression through stages (Ananth  
450 and Kleinbaum, 1997) and notably when individual categories of the outcome are of intrinsic  
451 interest (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). Here, the interest lies in comparing non-reporting vs.  
452 reporting farmers, and inside the reporting category, whether reporters had stopped reporting.  
453 However, the reporting behaviour categories were not considered to be equidistant, being a  
454 former reporter is considered more similar to being a current reporter than a non-reporter.  
455 Thus, an unconstrained continuation-ratio model was built, consisting in simultaneously  
456 fitting two separate models (Armstrong and Sloan, 1989), to allow the possibility of  
457 transition-dependent explanatory variables (Allison, 2012).

458

459 Usually, sampling designs for ordinal outcome studies are based on a cross-sectional survey  
460 or longitudinal follow-up i.e. one sample further split into different outcome categories. Here,  
461 a case-control study, based on outcome-dependent sampling where individuals are sampled  
462 depending on their outcome status and exposure information is then collected on the sampled

463 individuals, provided data for further outcome sub-classification. Naïve fitting of a  
464 continuation-ratio model under such a retrospective outcome-dependent sampling design  
465 would obtain biased parameter estimations (Greenland, 1994); whereas, with multiple  
466 outcome categories, coefficient estimates of the logistic regression are not modified by the  
467 sampling design, the intercept of the model is. This leads to biased and inaccurate predicted  
468 probabilities, as these are largely determined by the relative sample sizes for cases and  
469 controls. The sampling design was therefore taken into account in the analysis.

470

#### 471 *4.2. Reporting practices*

472 The results of this study suggested that notification procedures were well known by the  
473 formerly and currently reporting farmers, a result that contrasts with those from Dutch pig  
474 farmers who felt uncertainty about them (Elbers et al., 2010a). The reporting system was  
475 generally well accepted. The majority of the respondents considered that reporting an oyster  
476 mortality event was simple but a minority found it time consuming and complex. However,  
477 farmers tended to be dissatisfied with the feedback from the reporting system, considering  
478 themselves as poorly informed.

479

480 A misunderstanding of the aims of the reporting system was highlighted, as only 3% of the  
481 reporting farmers mentioned its surveillance and early warning purposes. A confounding with  
482 the financial compensation for production losses was frequent in the three reporting behaviour  
483 categories. In addition, the length of time between mortality observation and reporting was  
484 very variable, only 23% of the control farmers reporting within the week following the  
485 mortality observation and most did this at the end of the summer. This lack of reactivity may  
486 be explained by the misunderstanding of the aims of the mandatory notification. Delayed  
487 reporting is still frequent in animal-disease surveillance systems (World Bank, 2010). Given  
488 the importance of this issue for early detection of disease outbreaks in shellfish production,

489 because openness and connectivity of marine systems enhance disease spread (McCallum et  
490 al., 2004) and limit the use of classical control measures (Renault, 2009), farmers' lack of  
491 awareness about disease reporting warrants further attention. The farmers need to be better  
492 informed to encourage timely reporting of oyster mortality.

493

#### 494 *4.3. Factors associated with farmer reporting behaviour*

495 While the reasons for under-reporting often differ from one animal disease surveillance  
496 system to another, a number of common factors prevail. Two main groups of factors can  
497 usually explain under-reporting: inability to report (either inability to detect the event or to  
498 access to the reporting channels) or unwillingness to report, usually related to the existence of  
499 disincentives (World Bank, 2010). In this study, two different sets of factors were identified  
500 driving a farmer's decision to report oyster mortality, pertaining to both of these two main  
501 groups.

502

503 Detection is the limiting factor more often than access to reporting channels, and is commonly  
504 the result of insufficient awareness of a disease or of its threats (World Bank, 2010). In the  
505 present study, the lack of awareness about mortality reporting was highlighted and this was  
506 suspected to occur more frequently than the inability to detect oyster mortality or to access the  
507 reporting channels, as all the non-reporters had observed oyster mortality at least once during  
508 the study period and complexity of reporting procedures was only mentioned by 22% of the  
509 non-reporting farmers.

510 Unclear case definition can hinder disease reporting (World Bank, 2010), as for abortion in  
511 livestock (Bronner et al., 2013a), or a lack of specificity of clinical signs if a particular disease  
512 must be reported, such as avian influenza (Elbers et al., 2010b) or classical swine fever  
513 (Elbers et al., 2010a). The regulatory oyster mortality definition is subjective and its

514 estimation is not straightforward(European Union, 2006). In the present study, both  
515 qualitative and quantitative criteria used by the oyster farmers were collected to define an  
516 oyster mortality event. In particular, in the univariate analysis, counting dead oysters was  
517 significantly associated with compliant farmer reporting behaviour. This variable could be  
518 interpreted as an indicator of the attention farmers paid to their oysters, indicating a greater  
519 watchfulness of oysters by the combined categories of formerly- or currently-reporting  
520 farmers than by non-reporting farmers.

521 The model relating the probability of a non-reporting behaviour showed that the farmers  
522 producing exclusively diploid oysters were seven times more likely to under-report observed  
523 mortality than those producing triploid oysters. Production type highly influences husbandry  
524 management practices and the attention paid to the animals. This was also identified as an  
525 influencing factor for the under-reporting in the mandatory abortion notification system in  
526 cattle (Bronner et al., 2013b). Farmers producing exclusively diploid oysters often obtain  
527 sufficient spat resources from the sea, collecting “wild” spat in summer for free. Since the  
528 1990s, hatcheries also sell oyster spat, which is either diploid or triploid, to oyster farmers  
529 throughout the year (Gérard, 1994). Purchasing oysters may lead farmers to watch their  
530 shellfish more closely, which increases the probability of mortality detection and, thus,  
531 reporting. Effectively, although farmers raising triploid oysters did not differ farmers  
532 producing only diploid oysters as regards their own characteristics nor the general items of  
533 their farms, they had a tendency to visit their leasing grounds more often ( $p=0.08$ ). They were  
534 also more likely to count dead oysters ( $p=0.02$ ).

535 The probability of a farmer under-reporting oyster mortality was higher in farms having less  
536 than 20 leasing grounds, which could be considered as a proxy of the farm size. The farmers  
537 owning these smaller farms often worked alone, performing all oyster farming activities  
538 without any employees, which would leave them with a smaller amount of time for oyster

539 observation, thus decreasing the probability of mortality detection and of reporting. The  
540 farmers farming with a small area were older ( $p < 0.001$ ) and were less likely to count dead  
541 oysters ( $p = 0.03$ ) than farmers having more than 20 leasing grounds. Small farm size was also  
542 reported to be associated with a lower probability of reporting abortions in cattle (Bronner et  
543 al., 2013b) and scrapie suspicion in sheep (Hopp et al., 2007).

544 The farmers with a production cycle located both in Charente-Maritime and other departments  
545 were six times more likely to under-report observed oyster mortality than the ones with a  
546 local production cycle. This may also indicate that splitting farming activities between  
547 different locations reduces time for observation of oysters located in Charente-Maritime,  
548 decreasing the probability of mortality detection by the farmer and, thus, reporting.

549

550 Unwillingness to report is usually related to the existence of disincentives, such as bad  
551 consequences for trade or reputation or the lack of compensation for farmers (World Bank,  
552 2010), or lack of trust in government (Palmer, 2009; Elbers et al., 2010a; Limon et al., 2013).

553 In the present study, none of these were stated by the interviewed farmers, as, currently,  
554 mortality notification does not lead to truly penalizing consequences for oyster farmers.

555 However, farmers who had never received financial compensation for oyster mortality before  
556 2010 were eight times more likely to under-report oyster mortality than farmers who had  
557 already been compensated. This clearly illustrated the incentive effect of financial  
558 compensation for French oyster farmers, as previously reported for Dutch poultry farmers  
559 (Elbers et al., 2010b) or Norwegian sheep farmers (Hopp et al., 2007) but contrasts with  
560 Dutch pig farmers (Elbers et al., 2010a). However, even though compensation mechanisms  
561 were in place, some of the interviewed farmers had stopped reporting since 2010.

562

563 In fact, awareness and willingness to report should not be considered static. In the case of



564 endemic diseases, people can often become accustomed to a situation (World Bank, 2010).  
565 This habituation effect may have occurred here; the farmers' motivation to report mortality  
566 may have been reduced by the lack of available and effective measures to control the spread  
567 of this emerging pathogen in open waters, leading to this infection becoming endemic (Lupo  
568 et al., 2011b).

569 The model relating the conditional probability of a formerly-reporting behaviour, given that  
570 the farmer had already reported oyster mortality, has shown that the farmers with a small  
571 proportion of leasing grounds that are easily accessible (i.e. even at neap tide) were four times  
572 more likely to stop reporting oyster mortality. This may indicate lassitude as regards the effort  
573 needed to regularly monitor their oysters in relation to the perceived benefit. Indeed, the  
574 probability for a farmer to stop reporting oyster mortality was higher when the farmers  
575 thought that the amount of financial compensation was insufficient, and if they did not feel  
576 involved by the reporting system. These supported the hypothesis that formerly-reporting  
577 farmers were unaware of the legal framework of shellfish disease surveillance and that they  
578 misunderstood the aims of the reporting system, confounding them with the financial  
579 compensation system.

580 The farmers who had first notified authorities of oyster mortality in 2008 were eight times  
581 more likely to stop reporting oyster mortality than the others. This may illustrate a lack of  
582 awareness of the legal framework of the disease surveillance, formerly-reporting farmers  
583 being mostly influenced by recent events, as 2008 is the year when severe mass mortality  
584 outbreaks occurred in spat of Pacific oyster, associated with the first description of the virus  
585 genotype OsHV-1  $\mu$ Var (Segarra et al., 2010).

586 These results supported the hypothesis of a habituation effect combined with a lack of  
587 awareness of the aims of the surveillance system, oyster farmers looking for the self-interest  
588 in reporting, different from early detection of a disease outbreak. Such expectations have also

589 been identified in French cattle farmers (Bronner et al., 2013a), Bolivian livestock  
590 smallholders (Limon et al., 2013) and Dutch pig farmers (Elbers et al., 2010a).

591

592 Many programs to improve compliance with reporting duties have failed because they  
593 addressed only one reason for under-reporting, while neglecting others (World Bank, 2010).

594 In France, since 2008, a system for financial compensation for oyster production losses was

595 put in place and, since 2010 mortality notification has become mandatory to access to the

596 financial compensation (French Ministry of Agriculture, 2010b). The results of the present

597 study suggest that financial compensation was a clear incentive for farmers to report oyster

598 mortality. Despite this, some of the farmers have stopped reporting since 2010, suggesting

599 that financial compensation was not sufficient to sustain their motivation to report oyster

600 mortalities, as it was observed after the H7N7 highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic in

601 2003 in the Netherlands (Elbers et al., 2010b). Indeed, the challenge is to find a strategy that

602 is not only successful, but also sustainable (Hoinville et al., 2009). As previously observed in

603 Norwegian sheep farmers (Hopp et al., 2007), this study has identified both economic and

604 non-economic values that influence French oyster farmers' reporting behaviour. In particular,

605 their reporting behaviour reflected a lack of knowledge about the major issue of timely

606 reporting oyster mortality, as half of the reporters waited the end of the summer to report.

607 These results suggest that financial incentive is not sufficient to achieve the aim of early

608 detection of disease, notably because it does not account for the need of a timely reporting.

609 These also suggest that, to ensure sustainable compliance of oyster farmers with reporting

610 duties, their concerns about non-economic values should also be considered. In particular,

611 oyster mortality reporting could be improved by changing these attitudes through farmer

612 education concerning the aims of a surveillance system and the great importance of their

613 vigilance and timely reporting for the detection of potential emerging or exotic diseases in

614 shellfish. For this, participatory approaches are needed to ensure that the system will be  
615 responsive to stakeholders' needs and to increase their sense of ownership and commitment  
616 towards sustaining the system (Mariner et al., 2011). In addition, studies through  
617 participatory approaches about disease management in farmed marine shellfish, in particular  
618 measures to mitigate the effects of diseases on production, may constitute practical means for  
619 sustaining the motivation of oyster farmers to participate in the surveillance system.

620

#### 621 **4. Conclusion**

622 This study provided some first insights into the factors driving a farmer's decision to report  
623 oyster mortality , pertaining to inability to detect the mortality event and to unwillingness to  
624 report. Financial compensation for oyster production losses appeared to be a clear incentive  
625 for reporting, but was countered by a habituation effect, combined with a lack of awareness of  
626 the aims of the reporting system: oyster farmers sought self-interest in reporting rather than  
627 the early detection of a disease outbreak.

628 Results showed that both economic compensation and farmers' non-economic values and  
629 perceptions should be taken into account to improve oyster farmer reporting compliance and  
630 sustainability. These findings are relevant from an educational as well as an animal-health  
631 perspective because they indicate that oyster mortality reporting could be improved by  
632 changing attitudes through education and participatory approaches.

633

634

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639

#### 640 **Conflict of interest statement**

641 None.

642

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763

763

764 **Table 1.** Summary of the content of the questionnaire used to analyse factors associated with  
765 farmers' reporting practices and behaviour towards oyster mortality, Charente-Maritime,  
766 France, 2012

767

768 *[Table 1 here]*

769 **Table 2.** Descriptive results for potential explanatory variables associated with farmer  
770 reporting behaviour of oyster mortalities, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

771

772 *[Table 2 here]*

773 **Table 3.** Explanatory variables for the farmer reporting behaviour retained at the univariate  
774 step, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

775

776 *[Table 3 here]*

777 **Table 4.** Final multivariate continuation-ratio logit model<sup>1</sup> for farmer reporting behaviour  
778 concerning oyster mortality, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

779

780 *[Table 4 here]*

781 **Table 5.** Contingency table for the classification performance of the final model for reporting  
782 behaviour categories

783

784 *[Table 5 here]*

785

786 **Figure 1.** Predicted probabilities<sup>2</sup> of the three reporting behaviour categories stratified by

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<sup>1</sup> Deviance =22.34, model d.f.=15, Goodness-of-fit  $\chi^2$ -test statistic p-Value = 0.10

<sup>2</sup> **Using baseline case:** <20 leasing grounds in Charente-Maritime; <25% leasing grounds accessible even at neap tide; production cycle located in Charente-Maritime and in other departments; only diploid oysters produced;

787 levels of the risk factors, based on the results from an ordinal logistic regression for farmer  
788 reporting behaviour concerning oyster mortality, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

789

790 *[Figure 1 here]*

791

---

first mortality notification in 2008; no compensation received during 2007-2009; farmer did not feel involved in the notification system; and farmer thought that amount of compensation is insufficient.

791 **Table 1.** Summary of the content of the questionnaire used to analyse factors associated with  
792 farmers' reporting practices and behaviour towards oyster mortality, Charente-Maritime,  
793 France, 2012

794

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**Sociodemographics**

Gender, age

Membership of a collective farmer's society

**Farm characteristics**

Other animal species produced, level of specialization

**Farming practices**

Rearing cycle: place and time for spat collection and growing

Types of production

Frequency of visits to leasing grounds

**Oyster mortality history**

Description of a mortality event, method used for detection

Time of occurrence, type and origin of concerned oysters

Perception of financial compensation for oyster mortality

**Oyster mortality reporting system***Knowledge*

Mandatory aspect of the mortality notification

Reporting procedures and tools, communication tools

*Reporting practices and behaviour*

Regularity, reporting time, time needed

Reasons for under-reporting

*Attitudes toward the reporting system*

Perceived usefulness, perceived simplicity, satisfaction level with the system, with the data feedback

Perceived drawbacks, desired improvements

---

795

795 **Table 2.** Descriptive results for potential explanatory variables associated with farmer  
 796 reporting behaviour of oyster mortalities, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

797

Variables and categories	Reporting behaviour		
	No. of responses (%) or median [range] Reporter (N=49)	Former reporter (N=40)	Non reporter (N=27)
<b>Characteristics of the oyster farmer</b>			
Gender			
Male	43 (88)	37 (93)	27 (100)
Female	6 (12)	3 (7)	0 (0)
Age	48 [30-65]	49 [31-68]	49 [29-74]
29-41 years	11 (25)	8 (21)	4 (15)
41-47 years	11 (25)	9 (24)	8 (31)
48-52 years	9 (20)	10 (26)	6 (23)
53 and older	13 (30)	11 (29)	8 (31)
Member of a collective farmer's society			
Yes	19 (39)	14 (35)	10 (37)
No	30 (61)	26 (65)	17 (63)
<b>General items related to the farm</b>			
Geographical location of the farm headquarters			
North	7 (14)	6 (15)	1 (4)
South	42 (86)	34 (85)	26 (96)
Had side activity			
Yes	6 (12)	7 (17)	5 (19)
No	43 (88)	33 (83)	22 (81)
Other shellfish produced			
Yes	6 (12)	5 (12)	3 (11)
No	43 (88)	35 (88)	24 (89)
Farm size (total leasing area) in Charente-Maritime	280 [26-1197]	235 [45-612]	188 [6-967]
<200 m <sup>2</sup>	11 (23)	16 (40)	15 (56)
≥200 m <sup>2</sup>	37 (77)	24 (60)	12 (44)
Number of leasing grounds in Charente-Maritime	23 [1-70]	19 [5-50]	16 [1-31]
<20	15 (31)	22 (55)	21 (78)
≥20	33 (69)	18 (45)	6 (22)
Average tide coefficient of the leasing grounds	65 [30-84]	65 [32-87]	64 [38-82]
<55	8 (17)	5 (13)	8 (32)
≥55	39 (83)	34 (87)	17 (68)
Proportion of leasing grounds accessible only at strong tide (tide coefficient ≥70)	56 [0-100]	58 [14-100]	69 [33-100]
<60%	33 (70)	27 (69)	11 (44)
≥60%	14 (30)	12 (31)	14 (56)
Proportion of leasing grounds accessible even at neap tide (tide coefficient <70)	44 [0-100]	42 [0-86]	31 [0-67]

<25%	6 (13)	9 (23)	9 (36)
≥25%	41 (87)	30 (77)	16 (64)

### Husbandry practices

Location of the production cycle			
Only in Charente-Maritime	37 (76)	32 (80)	18 (67)
In Charente-Maritime and other departments	12 (24)	8 (20)	9 (33)
Production stages			
Spat collection + farming+ sending	40 (82)	32 (80)	17 (63)
Spat collection +/- farming +/- sending	9 (18)	8 (20)	10 (37)
Spat collection			
Yes	46 (94)	37 (92)	23 (85)
No	3 (6)	3 (8)	4 (15)
Growing			
Yes	48 (92)	38 (95)	23 (85)
No	1 (2)	2 (5)	4 (15)
Sending			
Yes	41 (84)	34 (85)	21 (78)
No	8 (16)	6 (15)	6 (22)
Spat selling			
Yes	47 (96)	37 (92)	22 (81)
No	2 (4)	3 (8)	
Oyster purchase			
Yes	30 (61)	21 (53)	7 (26)
No	19 (39)	19 (47)	20 (74)
Production type			
Only diploid oysters	17 (35)	19 (48)	22 (81)
Triploid +/- diploid oysters	32 (65)	21 (52)	5 (19)
Farming technique			
Off-bottom (plastic mesh bags set on trestles)	45 (92)	37 (92)	23 (85)
On-bottom (onto the intertidal seabed)	4 (8)	3 (8)	4 (15)
Frequency of visits to each leasing ground			
More often than twice a month	23 (47)	22 (55)	15 (55)
Once a month	19 (39)	11 (27)	8 (30)
Not predetermined	7 (14)	7 (18)	4 (15)

### Detecting practices of an oyster mortality

Nauseating odour			
Yes	26 (53)	29 (72)	13 (48)
No	23 (47)	11 (28)	14 (52)
Empty shells			
Yes	47 (96)	37 (92)	25 (93)
No	2 (4)	3 (8)	2 (7)
Flesh in shells <sup>3</sup>			
Yes	20 (41)	16 (40)	15 (56)
No	29 (59)	24 (60)	12 (44)

<sup>3</sup> In shellfish, death leads to detachment of the body (flesh) of the animal from its shell and this flesh is quickly carried away by the sea water currents. Thus, observation of flesh in the shell of the dead animal is an indicator of recent occurrence of mortality.

Specific noise when manipulating oyster bags			
Yes	6 (12)	4 (10)	6 (22)
No	43 (88)	36 (90)	21 (78)
Counting dead oysters			
Yes	43 (93)	32 (86)	17 (68)
No	3 (7)	5 (14)	8 (32)
Threshold mortality % considered abnormal			
<20%	15 (32)	10 (28)	11 (42)
≥20%	32 (68)	26 (72)	15 (58)
<b>Mortality history of oyster production</b>			
Mortality detection during 2008-2011			
Yes	44 (90)	38 (95)	23 (85)
No	5 (10)	2 (5)	4 (15)
Mortality detection in 2007			
Yes	12 (24)	8 (20)	5 (19)
No	37 (76)	32 (80)	22 (81)
Mortality detection in 2008			
Yes	44 (90)	39 (93)	23 (85)
No	5 (10)	1 (3)	4 (15)
Mortality detection in 2009			
Yes	45 (92)	40 (100)	25 (93)
No	4 (2)	0 (0)	2 (7)
Mortality detection in 2010			
Yes	46 (94)	39 (97)	26 (96)
No	3 (6)	1 (3)	1 (4)
Mortality detection in 2011			
Yes	46 (94)	39 (97)	26 (96)
No	3 (6)	1 (3)	1 (4)
<b>Oyster mortality reporting history</b>			
First notification in 2007			
Yes	17 (35)	5 (13)	0
No	32 (65)	35 (87)	0
First notification in 2008			
Yes	17 (35)	32 (80)	0
No	32 (65)	8 (20)	0
First notification in 2009			
Yes	6 (12)	1 (3)	0
No	43 (88)	39 (97)	0
First notification in 2010			
Yes	4 (8)	2 (5)	0
No	45 (92)	38 (95)	0
First notification in 2011			
Yes	5 (10)	0 (0)	0
No	44 (90)	40 (100)	0

**Economic history of the farm related to financial compensation for oyster production losses**

Compensation received during 2007-2011			
Yes	48 (98)	35 (87)	12 (44)
No	1 (2)	5 (13)	15 (56)
Compensation received during 2007-2009 (before notification was mandatory to obtain compensation)			
Yes	46 (94)	34 (85)	11 (41)
No	3 (6)	6 (15)	16 (59)
Compensation received in 2007			
Yes	4 (8)	2 (5)	0 (0)
No	45 (92)	38 (95)	27 (100)
Compensation received in 2008			
Yes	43 (88)	28 (70)	9 (33)
No	6 (12)	12 (30)	18 (67)
Compensation received in 2009			
Yes	46 (94)	31 (77)	6 (22)
No	3 (6)	9 (23)	21 (78)
Compensation received in 2010			
Yes	45 (92)	26 (65)	4 (15)
No	4 (8)	14 (35)	23 (85)
Compensation received in 2011			
Yes	46 (94)	20 (50)	3 (11)
No	3 (6)	20 (50)	24 (89)
<b>Perceptions towards mandatory notification of oyster mortality</b>			
Farmer thought the notification system too complex <sup>4</sup>			
True	22 (45)	22 (55)	7 (26)
False	27 (55)	18 (45)	20 (74)
Farmer did not feel involved in the notification system <sup>1</sup>			
True	2 (4)	7 (18)	8 (30)
False	47 (96)	33 (83)	19 (70)
Farmer adopted a fatalistic and discouraged attitude with regard to the current situation <sup>1</sup>			
True	7 (14)	3 (8)	5 (19)
False	42 (86)	37 (92)	22 (81)
Confounded mortality notification system for surveillance with compensation system for losses <sup>1</sup>			
True	31 (63)	28 (70)	20 (74)
False	18 (37)	12 (30)	7 (26)
Farmer thought the amount of compensation insufficient <sup>1</sup>			
True	48 (98)	31 (77)	20 (74)
False	1 (2)	9 (23)	7 (26)

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<sup>4</sup> These variables were built transversally from the responses to different questions.



799 **Table 3.** Explanatory variables for the farmer reporting behaviour retained at the univariate step, Charente-Maritime, France, 2012

Variables and categories	Former reporter vs. Reporters				p-Value	Non reporters vs. (Former reporters and Reporters)				p-Value
	$\beta_1$	SE( $\beta_1$ )	OR <sub>1</sub>	OR <sub>1</sub> CI <sub>95%</sub>		$\beta_2$	SE( $\beta_2$ )	OR <sub>2</sub>	OR <sub>2</sub> CI <sub>95%</sub>	
<b>General items related to the farm</b>										
Geographical location of the farm headquarters										
South vs. North	0.029	0.285	1.06	0.35-3.23	0.92	-0.746	0.498	0.22	0.03-1.58	0.134
Farm size (leasing area in Charente-Maritime)										
<200 m <sup>2</sup> vs. $\geq$ 200 m <sup>2</sup>	0.404	0.223	2.24	0.94-5.37	0.070	0.519	0.212	2.82	1.23-6.47	0.014
Number of leasing grounds										
<20 vs. $\geq$ 20	0.495	0.211	2.69	1.18-6.14	0.019	0.787	0.239	4.82	1.89-12.33	0.001
Average tide coefficient of the leasing grounds										
<55 vs. $\geq$ 55	-0.166	0.292	0.72	0.23-2.25	0.57	0.486	0.248	2.64	1.00-6.97	0.050
Proportion of leasing grounds accessible only at strong tide (tide coefficient $\geq$ 70)										
<65% vs. $\geq$ 65%	-0.023	0.223	0.95	0.40-2.29	0.92	-0.539	0.220	0.34	0.14-0.81	0.015
Proportion of leasing grounds accessible even at neap tide (tide coefficient <70)										
<25% vs. $\geq$ 25%	0.359	0.275	2.05	0.70-6.01	0.191	0.490	0.238	2.66	1.05-6.78	0.040
<b>Husbandry practices</b>										
Location of the production cycle										
Charente-Maritime and other departments vs. only in Charente Maritime	-0.130	0.244	0.77	0.30-2.01	0.59	0.273	0.226	1.73	0.71-4.18	0.23

<b>Production stages</b>										
Spat collection + farming+ sending vs. spat collection +/- farming +/- sending	-0.053	0.256	0.90	0.33-2.45	0.84	-0.456	0.226	0.40	0.17-0.97	0.043
<b>Spat collection</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.109	0.400	0.80	0.16-3.86	0.79	-0.573	0.306	0.32	0.10-1.06	0.061
<b>Growing</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.463	0.588	0.40	0.04-3.97	0.43	-0.803	0.376	0.20	0.05-0.88	0.033
<b>Spat selling</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.322	0.444	0.53	0.09-2.99	1.47	-0.536	0.334	0.34	0.09-1.27	0.108
<b>Oyster purchase</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.178	0.204	0.70	0.32-1.56	0.38	-0.672	0.229	0.26	0.11-0.64	0.003
<b>Production type</b>										
Only diploids vs. triploids +/- diploids	0.266	0.206	1.70	0.76-3.82	0.20	0.934	0.253	6.48	2.40-17.48	0.002
<b>Detecting practices of an oyster mortality</b>										
<b>Nauseating odour</b>										
Yes vs. no	0.423	0.215	2.33	1.00-5.42	0.049	-0.278	0.208	0.57	0.25-1.30	0.18
<b>Flesh in shells</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.017	0.205	0.97	0.43-2.16	0.93	0.305	0.208	1.84	0.81-4.16	0.14
<b>Specific noise when manipulating oyster bags</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.114	0.323	0.80	0.22-2.83	0.72	0.407	0.268	2.26	0.79-6.46	0.13
<b>Counting dead oysters</b>										
Yes vs. no	-0.403	0.364	0.45	0.11-1.86	0.27	-0.742	0.269	0.23	0.08-0.65	0.006

Value of the mortality % abnormal threshold <20% vs. ≥20%	-0.099	0.231	0.82	0.33-2.03	0.67	0.266	0.218	1.70	0.72-4.01	0.22
<b>Notification history of oyster mortality</b>										
First notification in 2007 Yes vs. no	-0.657	0.267	0.27	0.09-0.77	0.014	NA <sup>5</sup>	NA	NA	NA	NA
First notification in 2008 Yes vs. no	1.010	0.235	7.53	3.00-18.88	<0.0001	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
<b>Mortality history of the oyster production</b>										
Mortality detection in 2008 Yes vs. no	0.744	0.528	4.43	0.56-35.11	0.16	-0.439	0.323	0.42	0.12-1.47	0.17
<b>Economic history of the farm related to compensation for oyster production losses</b>										
Financial compensation received during 2007-2009 No vs. yes	0.498	0.351	2.71	0.68-10.71	0.16	1.280	0.247	12.93	4.90-34.07	<0.001
Financial compensation received in 2008 No vs. yes	0.561	0.263	3.07	1.10-8.60	0.034	1.033	0.228	7.89	3.23-19.28	<0.0001
Financial compensation received in 2009 No vs. yes	0.747	0.334	4.45	1.20-16.47	0.025	1.556	0.262	22.46	8.06-62.60	<0.0001

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<sup>5</sup> Not available

Financial compensation received in 2010 No vs. yes	0.901	0.292	6.06	1.93-19.04	0.002	1.561	0.283	22.68	7.49-68.62	<0.0001
Financial compensation received in 2011 No vs. yes	1.365	0.319	15.33	4.39-53.51	<0.0001	1.567	0.309	22.96	6.85-76.94	<0.0001
<b>Perceptions toward mandatory notification of oyster mortality</b>										
Farmer felt the notification system was too complex True vs. false	0.514	0.229	2.79	1.14-6.84	0.025	-0.203	0.203	0.67	0.30-1.47	0.32
Farmer did not feel involved in the notification system True vs. false	0.803	0.694	4.99	1.07-23.34	0.041	0.660	0.258	3.74	1.36-10.28	0.011
Farmer thought the amount of compensation insufficient True vs. false	1.317	0.510	13.94	1.89-102.9	0.010	0.509	0.260	2.77	1-7.65	0.050

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801 **Table 4.** Final multivariate continuation-ratio logit model<sup>6</sup> for farmer reporting behaviour concerning oyster mortality, Charente-Maritime,  
 802 France, 2012

Variables and categories	Former reporters vs. Reporters <sup>7</sup>				p-Value	Non-reporters vs. (Former reporters and Reporters) <sup>8</sup>				p-Value	
	$\beta_1$	SE( $\beta_1$ )	OR <sub>1</sub>	OR <sub>1</sub> CI <sub>95%</sub>		$\beta_2$	SE( $\beta_2$ )	OR <sub>2</sub>	OR <sub>2</sub> CI <sub>95%</sub>		
Intercept	2.089	0.765					-1.234	0.238			
Number of leasing grounds <20 vs. $\geq$ 20							0.801	0.314	4.96	1.45-16.97	0.011
Proportion of leasing grounds accessible even at neap tide <25% vs. $\geq$ 25%	0.724	0.325	4.26	1.19-15.20	0.026						
Location of the production cycle In Charente-Maritime and other departments vs. only in Charente-Maritime							0.926	0.295	6.37	2.00-20.26	0.002
Production type Only diploid oysters vs. triploid +/- diploid oysters							0.985	0.274	7.18	2.45-20.99	0.0003
First mortality notification in 2008 Yes vs. no	1.063	0.289	8.37	2.69-26.02	0.0002						
Financial compensation received during 2007-2009 period No vs. yes							1.011	0.306	7.55	2.28-25.04	0.0009
Farmer did not feel involved in the notification system True vs. false	0.997	0.398	7.34	1.54 -34.96	0.012						

<sup>6</sup> Deviance =22.34, model d.f.=15, Goodness-of-fit  $\chi^2$ -test statistic p-Value = 0.10

<sup>7</sup> Number of observations = 39 Formerly reporting and 47 Reporting farmers, Deviance =5.29, model d.f.=6

<sup>8</sup> Number of observations = 27 Non-reporting farmers and 86 Formerly-reporting or Reporting farmers, Deviance =17.05, model d.f.=9

Farmer thought the amount of compensation  
insufficient  
True vs. false

1.427 0.720 17.34 1.03-291.21 0.047

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804 **Table 5.** Contingency table for the classification performance of the final model for reporting behaviour categories

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<b>Observed outcome category</b>	<b>Observed number</b>	<b>Predicted outcome category</b>		
		Reporting farmer	Formerly-reporting farmer	Non-reporting farmer
Reporting farmer	48	31	17	0
Formerly-reporting farmer	40	5	30	5
Non-reporting farmer	27		14	13

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Figure 1

