| Type |
Article |
| Date |
2001-03 |
| Language |
English |
| Author(s) |
Guyader Olivier 1, Thebaud Olivier1 |
| Affiliation(s) |
1 : Service d’Economie Maritime IFREMER BP 70, 29280 Plouzane, France |
| Source |
Marine Policy (0308-597X), 2001-03 , Vol. 25 , N. 2 , P. 103-112 |
| DOI |
10.1016/S0308-597X(00)00041-5 |
| WOS© Times Cited |
41 |
| Keyword(s) |
Fisheries management, Rights-based management, Individual transferable quotas, Distributional issues, Economic simulation |
| Abstract |
Rights-based management regimes are considered by economists as an important solution to the problems of excess capacity and biological over-harvesting of fisheries. In practice, adoption of such regimes, and particularly of those relying on individual quota allocations, has often met with resistance from within the fisheries concerned. A key reason for this resistance appears to be the distributional conflicts which arise in the process of implementing the regimes. An economic analysis of the nature of these conflicts in the different contexts in which they have been observed is proposed. The approach centres on the way in which distributional conflicts can influence the operation of management systems and their impacts on fisheries, from the country to the individual firm level. As an illustration, an analysis of the economic processes at firm level is developed based on the simulation of a fishery managed under individual transferable quotas. |
| Full Text |
| File |
Pages |
Size |
Access |
|
10 |
137 KB |
Access on demand |
| Author's final draft |
26 |
299 KB |
Open access |
|
