FN Archimer Export Format
PT J
TI Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution
BT 
AF GUILLEN, Jordi
   MACHER, Claire
   MERZEREAUD, Mathieu
   BONCOEUR, Jean
   GUYADER, Olivier
AS 1:1,2;2:1;3:1;4:3;5:1;
FF 1:PDG-RBE-EM;2:PDG-RBE-EM;3:PDG-RBE-EM;4:;5:PDG-RBE-EM;
C1 IFREMER, UMR AMURE, Unite Econ Maritime, F-29280 Plouzane, France.
   CSIC, Inst Ciencies Mar, E-08003 Barcelona, Spain.
   Univ Brest, UMR AMURE, IUEM, F-29238 Brest 3, France.
C2 IFREMER, FRANCE
   CSIC, SPAIN
   UBO, FRANCE
SI BREST
SE PDG-RBE-EM
UM AMURE
IN WOS Ifremer jusqu'en 2018
   copubli-france
   copubli-europe
   copubli-univ-france
IF 1.405
TC 20
UR https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00260/37086/35593.pdf
LA English
DT Article
DE ;Remuneration systems;share remuneration;lay system;MSY;MEY;open access;bioeconomic modeling;nephrops
AB Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions. 
PY 2015
SO Marine Resource Economics
SN 0738-1360
PU Univ Chicago Press
VL 30
IS 2
UT 000351116400001
BP 123
EP 138
DI 10.1086/679970
ID 37086
ER

EF