FN Archimer Export Format
PT J
TI Incentive effect of joint and several liability in fishery cooperatives on regulatory compliance
BT 
AF Bellanger, Manuel
   Holland, Daniel S.
   Anderson, Christopher M.
   Guyader, Olivier
AS 1:1;2:2;3:3;4:1;
FF 1:PDG-RBE-EM;2:;3:;4:PDG-RBE-EM;
C1 Unité d’Economie Maritime UMR 6308 AMURE Ifremer, Univ Brest, CNRS, IUEM Plouzane, France
   Northwest Fisheries Science Center NOAA Fisheries Seattle Washington, usa
   School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences University of Washington Seattle Washington, usa
C2 IFREMER, FRANCE
   NOAA, USA
   UNIV WASHINGTON, USA
SI BREST
SE PDG-RBE-EM
UM AMURE
IN WOS Ifremer UMR
   copubli-int-hors-europe
IF 6.785
TC 5
UR https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00495/60667/64202.pdf
LA English
DT Article
DE ;co-management;compliance regime;enforcement;harvester cooperatives;monitoring;nested institutions
AB Cooperative‐based catch share systems can be implemented such that the members of the same fishery cooperative are jointly and severally liable for not exceeding collectively assigned fishing rights. In practice, this means that a regulator can take away catch privileges from an entire cooperative that overruns its collective quota, effectively creating a penalty much larger than what could be recovered with an individual fine. Fishery cooperatives then typically implement their own internal compliance regime that includes monitoring and penalties. This article first reviews compliance practice in cooperative‐based catch share systems by examining the commonalities and differences in the way compliance regimes are structured (observation and reporting requirements, penalty scheme, internal enforcement authority and indemnification mechanisms) in a number of internal agreements from fishery cooperatives in North America and in Europe. Based on our review of cooperatives and the literature on compliance, we discuss how incentives to comply may be different for an individual fisherman operating in a fishery cooperative where joint and several liability applies as compared to an individual fishing quota baseline situation without fishery cooperative. Our review suggests that, from the regulators’ point of view, joint and several liability can increase the level of compliance for a given enforcement expenditure. However, the regulator cannot rely solely on cooperatives to carry out controls and must ensure that the cooperatives themselves have an interest in setting up an effective monitoring system and will enforce sanctions within the cooperative. 
PY 2019
PD JUN
SO Fish And Fisheries
SN 1467-2960
PU Wiley
VL 20
IS 4
UT 000474606100007
BP 715
EP 728
DI 10.1111/faf.12372
ID 60667
ER

EF