FN Archimer Export Format
PT J
TI Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point
BT 
AF SELLES, Jules
   BONHOMMEAU, Sylvain
   GUILLOTREAU, Patrice
   VALLEE, Thomas
AS 1:1,3;2:2;3:3;4:3;
FF 1:;2:PDG-RBE-DOI;3:;4:;
C1 Département Milieux et Peuplements Aquatiques, Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, UMR BOREA 7208, CP 26, 43 rue Cuvier, 75005 Paris, France
   IFREMER Délégation de l’Océan Indien, Rue Jean Bertho, BP 60, 97822, Le Port Cedex, France
   LEMNA, Université de Nantes, IEMN-IAE, Chemin de la Censive-du-Tertre, BP 52231, 44322, Nantes Cedex, France
C2 MNHN, FRANCE
   IFREMER, FRANCE
   UNIV NANTES, FRANCE
SI LA REUNION
SE PDG-RBE-DOI
IN WOS Ifremer UPR
   copubli-france
   copubli-univ-france
IF 2.181
TC 1
UR https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00623/73488/72786.pdf
LA English
DT Article
DE ;Common-pool resources;Experimental economics;Fisheries management;International fisheries;Policy making;Tipping points
AB Complex dynamic systems such as common-pool resource systems can undergo a critical shift at a given threshold, the so-called tipping point, which potentially requires substantial changes from the management system. We present in this research a framed laboratory experiment design to examine how the threat of economic sanctions influences the strategic management of a common-pool resource. We use the context of the East Atlantic bluefin tuna international fishery as it has been the archetype of an overfished and mismanaged fishery until a dramatic reinforcement of its regulations followed the threat of a trade ban. We consider endogenous threats and examine their effects on cooperation through harvest decisions taken in the context of non-cooperative game theory in which cooperation could be sustained using a trigger strategy. Our experiment results show that the threat of economic sanctions fosters more cooperative behaviors, less over-exploitation, and a more precautionary management of resources, reducing the economic rent dissipation. This result is exacerbated when the location of the tipping point that triggers the economic sanction is uncertain. In order to avoid free-riding behaviors and foster the emergence of a self-enforcing agreement, we suggest to introduce economic sanctions, such as trade restrictions, associated with uncertain biological limit reference points. 
PY 2020
PD MAY
SO Environmental & Resource Economics
SN 0924-6460
PU Springer Science and Business Media LLC
VL 76
IS 1
UT 000523057600001
BP 153
EP 176
DI 10.1007/s10640-020-00419-y
ID 73488
ER

EF