FN Archimer Export Format
PT J
TI Cross-sectoral externalities related to natural resources and ecosystem services
BT 
AF Bellanger, Manuel
   Fonner, Robert
   Holland, Daniel S.
   Libecap, Gary D.
   Lipton, Douglas W.
   Scemama, Pierre
   Speir, Cameron
   Thébaud, Olivier
AS 1:1;2:2;3:2;4:3;5:4;6:1;7:5;8:1;
FF 1:PDG-RBE-EM;2:;3:;4:;5:;6:PDG-RBE-EM;7:;8:PDG-RBE-EM;
C1 Unité d'Economie Maritime, UMR 6308 AMURE, Ifremer, Univ Brest, CNRS, IUEM, Plouzane, France
   Northwest Fisheries Science Center, NOAA Fisheries, Seattle, WA, USA
   Bren School of Environmental Science and Management and Economics Department, UC Santa Barbara, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
   NOAA Fisheries, Silver Spring, MD, USA
   Southwest Fisheries Science Center, NOAA Fisheries, Fisheries Ecology Division, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
C2 IFREMER, FRANCE
   NOAA, USA
   UNIV CALIF SANTA BARBARA, USA
   NOAA, USA
   NOAA, USA
SI BREST
SE PDG-RBE-EM
UM AMURE
IN WOS Ifremer UMR
   copubli-int-hors-europe
IF 6.536
TC 6
UR https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00680/79211/81765.pdf
LA English
DT Article
DE ;Coasean bargaining;Environmental policy;Institutions;Multi-jurisdictional conflicts;Property rights;Transaction costs
AB Standard approaches to environmental and natural resource use externalities generally focus on single-sector resources and user groups. Remedies include Pigouvian-style government constraints, small group controls following Elinor Ostrom, or less frequently, bargaining across users as outlined by Ronald Coase. However, many difficult natural resource management problems involve competing uses of the same resource or multiple interdependent resources, across multiple, heterogeneous sectors. Cross-sectoral externalities are generated and impede attainment of conservation objectives. The multiplicity of resources and stakeholders, who may have different property rights, hold different use or non-use values, have different traditions, or fall under different regulatory regimes, increases the likelihood of multi-jurisdictional conflicts. We provide an institutional analysis following Oliver Williamson's four-levels of institutions (social embeddedness, institutional environment, governance, resource allocation) to illustrate the sources of potential conflict, the costs of addressing them, and the potentials for exchange. In comparing the costs of alternative approaches, we include transaction costs associated property rights; the costs of lobbying, implementing, and enforcing government regulation; and the costs of scaling up from small-group controls when resource problems involve multiple sectors and heterogeneous populations. In our illustrative case examples, instruments that are not formal property rights are exchanged at lower transaction costs. We close by discussing how Coasean, Pareto-improving voluntary exchange agreements may be lower cost, more effective, and more durable solutions than alternative management regimes to mitigate cross-sectoral externalities. 
PY 2021
PD JUL
SO Ecological Economics
SN 0921-8009
PU Elsevier BV
VL 184
UT 000636442700016
DI 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.106990
ID 79211
ER

EF