FN Archimer Export Format
PT J
TI Credit Systems for Bycatch and Biodiversity Conservation
BT 
AF Squires, Dale
   Lent, Rebecca
   Dutton, Peter H.
   DAGORN, Laurent
   Ballance, Lisa T.
AS 1:1;2:2;3:1;4:3;5:4;
FF 1:;2:;3:;4:;5:;
C1 Southwest Fisheries Science Center, U.S. NOAA Fisheries, La Jolla, CA, United States
   International Whaling Commission, Cambridge, United Kingdom
   MARBEC, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS, Ifremer, IRD, Sète, France
   Marine Mammal Institute, Oregon State University, Newport, OR, United States
C2 NOAA, USA
   INTERN WHALING COMM, UK
   IRD, FRANCE
   UNIV OREGON STATE, USA
UM MARBEC
IN WOS Cotutelle UMR
   DOAJ
   copubli-europe
   copubli-int-hors-europe
IF 5.247
TC 5
UR https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00696/80853/84477.pdf
LA English
DT Article
DE ;credits;bycatch;habitat impact;conservation;economic incentives;credit systems;property rights
AB Credit systems for mitigation of bycatch and habitat impact, incentive-based approaches, incentivize changes in fishery operator behavior and decision-making and allow flexibility in a least-cost method. Three types of credit systems, originally developed to address environmental pollution, are presented and evaluated as currently underutilized incentive-based approaches. The first, a cap-and-trade approach, evolved out of direct regulation through restricted limits with flexibility through the creation of tradeable unused portion of the limit, called credits. The second, a penalty-reward system, incentivizes bycatch- and habit-impact- reducing vessel behavior through rewards for positive behavior, and penalties for negative behavior. The third is a hybrid of the first two. All three systems can be used in the context of both absolute (fixed) and relative (rate-based or proportional) credits. Transferable habitat impact credit systems are developed for area management. The cap-and-trade credit system is directly compared to a comparable property rights system in terms of characteristics, strengths, weakness, and applicability. The Scottish Conservation Scheme and halibut bycatch reduction in the Alaskan multispecies groundfish fishery provide real-world examples of success with credit systems. The strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of credit systems are summarized, along with a set of recommendations. Cap-and-trade credit systems provide an important alternative to property rights, such as when rights are not feasible, and for this reason should prove useful for international fisheries. Penalty-reward and hybrid credit systems can substitute for cap-and-trade credit systems or property rights or complement them by addressing a related but otherwise unaddressed issue. 
PY 2021
PD MAY
SO Frontiers In Marine Science
SN 2296-7745
PU Frontiers Media SA
VL 8
UT 000656210100001
DI 10.3389/fmars.2021.613279
ID 80853
ER

EF