
Vulnerability and spatial competition: The case of fisheries and offshore wind projects

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Abstract :

Professional fishing activities are subject to spatial pressures. The cohabitation between a traditional fishing activity and development of the offshore wind energy industry raises questions about space sharing and rules of use. This paper proposes to adapt the vulnerability methodology developed to deal with global threats of climate change to this example of local, non-climatic change using the case study of a floating wind turbine project between Groix and Belle- le (France). To understand and compare the potential impact of the different artisanal fishing activities, the method aims to conceptualize vulnerability with the identification of social, economic, and environmental key pressures and address them in a composite index. Although the smallest fishing units appear to be the most vulnerable, this effect is associated with a high sensitivity to the area near the coast. This research also highlights the importance of transparency and clarity during the construction of the composite index to avoid misinterpretation. This case study supports the relevance of applying the vulnerability method on a local scale to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders and reduce negotiation costs.

Highlights

► Adaptation of the vulnerability assessment to a new local stressor (offshore wind farm) ► Fishing fleets have a distinct degree of vulnerability. ► Despite the limits, the plasticity of the method offers a wide range of applications.

Keywords : Vulnerability, Socio-Economic Impact, Heterogeneity, Fishery, Offshore Wind Farm

28 **1. Introduction**

29

30 Growing concerns about energy security and climate change have led the expansion of
31 sustainable technologies in our oceans (Alexander et al., 2013). In line with EU Directive
32 2009/28/EC, the number of offshore projects – particularly offshore wind farms – is increasing.
33 Marine systems are, however, already subject to strong environmental (global warming,
34 increases in invasive species), economic (growing numbers of regulations, development of
35 offshore aquaculture), and social (increase in competition between stakeholders) pressures
36 (Bennett et al., 2014). Thus, the development of renewable energy at sea places additional stress
37 on socio-ecological systems, especially traditional fishing communities (Christie et al., 2014).
38 Numerous studies have focused on the optimal location for offshore wind farms, considering
39 socio-economic and ecological aspects (Punt et al., 2009; Mackinson et al., 2006; Tien and van
40 der Hammen, 2015), the acceptability of projects according to the types of compensation
41 envisaged (Kermagoret et al., 2016), or the perception of risks and benefits (Klain et al., 2018;
42 Silva et al., 2019). To date, little attention has been paid to assessing the socio-economic effects
43 of wind farms on traditional fishing activities, considering the heterogeneity of fishing
44 communities. Fisheries are often composed of fleets with different physical (Alban and
45 Boncoeur, 2004), economic (Jardine et al., 2020), natural (Morgan, 2016), human (Guyader et
46 al., 2013) and social (Rosas et al., 2014) dimensions. It is, therefore, essential to assess the
47 socioeconomic impact of changes on heterogenous fishing activities subject to spatial
48 competition with a holistic point of view (Jardine et al., 2020).

49 The problems of competition for space between an old activity and a new one that has entered
50 its system (Loiseau et al., 2012) can be considered with the method of vulnerability. Initially
51 defined as 'the extent to which the components of a system are sensitive to or unable to cope
52 with the harmful effects of a stress factor' (IPCC, 2007), this analysis makes it possible to clarify

53 the cause-effect relationships on stakeholders of a change in the socio-ecosystem (Turner et al.,
54 2003). This method is generally applied to climate change-related pressures on coastal
55 communities (Comte et al., 2019). In the present paper, we adapt this method at a local scale.
56 Using the example of the offshore floating wind farm project between Groix and Belle-Île
57 (France), this paper seeks to identify the key pressures and threats to traditional fishing activity
58 in the area within a defined framework. The aim of this research is to compare and explain
59 which fishing activities are more likely to be vulnerable by the wind farm project. First, a
60 description of the impacted area and the threatened fishing fleets is done. Second,
61 conceptualization of vulnerability is adapted at a local scale. Third, a composite index is built
62 to obtain vulnerability scores with a scenario-based approach.

63

64 **2. The case study of spatial competition**

65

66 A vulnerability assessment was made on the project for the future floating offshore wind farm
67 located between the islands Groix and Belle-Île on the French Atlantic coast. Located 22 km
68 off the coast, the study area will contain three wind turbines lined up on a seabed of soft
69 sediment at 55 to 70 metres depth (Fig. 1).

70 As the offshore wind farm is not yet installed, a vulnerability projection based on previous data
71 and exposure suggestions can provide insight into the potential vulnerability. In 2018, 52
72 fishing vessels visited the area, making total landings of 420 tonnes with a current value of two
73 million euros (Ifremer, 2020).


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78 **Fig. 1.** Map showing the geographic position of the impacted zone (in grey)



79

80 Sources: Ifremer – SIH/AAMP

81 The community studied is represented by the fishers exploiting commercial stocks in the wind
 82 farm project. They engage in fishing activities that are heterogeneous from technical,
 83 environmental, and human perspectives (Carvalho et al., 2011). Therefore, a typology of fishing
 84 fleets is defined.

85 The segmentation used in this article is similar to the European framework used in reports on
 86 the economic performance of European fleets, according to 'the intersection of vessel length
 87 and fishing technique' (passive or active) (European Commission, 2019) (Table 1). The
 88 heterogeneity is partly mitigated by differentiating between vessels under 12 and over 12 metres
 89 in length and the *métiers*, defined as the combinations of target species, fishing area and catch
 90 technique (Tingley et al., 2003).

91 **Table 1.** Fleets present in the impacted area in 2018.

		Size of vessels	
		< 12 metres	≥ 12 metres
Fishing Technique	Lines, traps, nets	Fleet 1 18 vessels (35%)	N/A ^a 2 vessels
	Trawls, dredges, seines	Fleet 2 ^b 21 vessels (40%)	Fleet 3 13 vessels (25%)

92 ^a This fleet has a population of fewer than three vessels. For confidentiality reasons, this fleet
93 was not analysed.

94 ^b Fleet 2 can use lines, traps or nets as complementary activities.

95 Source: Ifremer, 2020

96

97 3. Conceptualization of vulnerability in the case of spatial competition


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99 Vulnerability is defined within the framework of socio-ecological systems (Holling 2001,
100 2013), incorporating three interlocking layers: Dimensions, Domains, and Indicators. First,
101 vulnerability is measured according to three generic dimensions: exposure, sensitivity, and
102 adaptive capacity (IPCC, 2007). For each dimension, domains are defined (Fig. 2). Domains
103 reflect the different characteristics most relevant for the study (O'Brien et al., 2013). The
104 definition of these domains comes from empirical and theoretical literature searches and
105 supplemented by a series of ten interviews with ship owners, conducted in February and March
106 2020. The domains are then represented by one or several indicators. The indicators were
107 primarily obtained from Ifremer, the French Institute of Marine Research
108 (<https://sih.ifremer.fr/>) and aims to represent all the important processes generating
109 vulnerability in the defined framework (Hinkel, 2011) (Table 2).

110

111

112 **Fig. 2.** Dimensions and domains (D1–D10) defining the spatial vulnerability of fishers
 113 regarding the implementation of an offshore wind farm.



114

115 Source: adapted from IPCC (2007) and Adger (2006)

116

117 3.1 Definition of exposure

118 Exposure is the first dimension to assess vulnerability. It is defined as 'the nature and degree to
 119 which a system experiences environmental or socio-political stress' (Adger, 2006). The
 120 development of offshore wind farm projects makes fishing activities vulnerable to reductions
 121 in exploitation area (Chen and Lopez-Carr, 2015). Thus, competition for the maritime space
 122 between traditional fishing and the emergence of new uses such as wind farms can lead to a
 123 decrease in income and welfare of fishers.

124 In contrast to environmental impacts linked to climate change, the degree of exposure caused
 125 by a reduction in space can be modified by public authorities and the designers of offshore wind

126 farms. This is done through access regulations applied to an area, which may vary from one
127 project to another (Christie et al., 2014; Blyth-Skyrme, 2011). Access to the area may or may
128 not be authorized depending on (1) the characteristics of the environment, (2) the fishing
129 technique used, and (3) the development stages of the project (McClanahan, 2010; Cohen and
130 Foale, 2013). For example, some access to the area is prohibited during the construction phase
131 at sea, but will be opened for some fishing techniques after construction (Roach et al., 2018).
132 The degree of exposure is therefore multi-dimensional where vessels can either have Spatial
133 Access (D1) represented by one indicator (spatial closure) and Temporal Access (D2)
134 represented by one indicator (temporal closure). Because the fishing location is based on
135 fishers' strategies and management rules, scenarios are suggested in the results section
136 according to modification on the degree of exposure in terms of spatial and time closure.

137

138 *3.2 Definition of sensitivity*

139 Sensitivity was defined as “the degree of coastal region’s society’s dependence on marine
140 fisheries” (Chen et al., 2015). Communities with a high dependence on resources and area will
141 likely be more sensitive to the implementation of new projects (Marshall et al., 2017). Resource
142 dependence is a concept initially described from an economic point of view with financial
143 dependence on the area (Stanford et al., 2013). Sensitivity is high when the share of turnover
144 derived from the impact zone is significant (Jardine et al., 2020). However, dependence on
145 resources is not only a question of income, particularly as Europe financial support can be
146 provided to accompany any measure causing a reduction in fishing opportunities. Dependency
147 considers the relationship between fishers and resources (Tidball and Stedman, 2013), including
148 (1) the consideration of the potential unique ecosystem and biodiversity in the target area.
149 Closing a valuable area (with high diversity, high biomass, or valuable species) constraints the

150 fishers in their activity (Gray et al., 2016), (2) the consideration of 'attachment to space' and
151 'sense of place' (Perry et al., 2014; Stedman, 2002). These cultural notions in relation to fishing
152 habits are stronger in a space where fishing has a long history. This dependence on
153 environmental, cultural, and economic resources is linked to the specific characteristics of a
154 marine ecosystem. The choice of a site at sea should consider the physical properties of the
155 environment for the new industry that is being established, and the financial and cultural
156 dependence manifested by the present activities of the fishing fleets. Environmental (D3)
157 dependency represented by the species richness in the area, economic (D4) dependency
158 represented by the income in the area and cultural (D5) dependencies represented by the
159 frequentation of the area and the fishing habit are therefore the three areas of sensitivity, which
160 is a complementary dimension to exposure (Fig. 2). Together, they encompass the potential
161 negative impacts of area closures.

162

163 *3.3 Definition of adaptive capacity*

164 Fishers have an adaptive capacity that counterbalances the potential impacts determined by the
165 first two dimensions (IPCC, 2007). Adaptive capacity highlights the ability of the community
166 to maintain its level of well-being, income, and cultural attachment in the face of spatial
167 competition. The concept of opportunity cost is one approach to explore adaptive capacity
168 (Smith et al., 2010). Opportunity cost defines the alternatives offered to fishers in terms of
169 income. A high opportunity cost reflects opportunities to move to other fisheries. However, if
170 this cost is low, fishers have few alternatives and will seek to maintain their activities in the
171 same area, through negotiation or strong opposition to the project. Much of the work on
172 fisheries is based on this concept of opportunity cost (Valcic, 2009; Smith, 2002). The difficulty
173 when using this measure is to incorporate non-market elements, independent of the operating

174 costs of a fishery and the expected revenues. Attachment to the profession practiced, to the
175 species sought and, more generally, to all the elements forming social capital, reinforce the
176 feeling of dependence on the area exploited. This is comparable to a low opportunity cost or,
177 as Smith et al. (2010) put this, 'a strong emotional attachment to fishing has the same qualitative
178 effect as a low non-fishery wage'.

179 Adaptive capacity is divided into five areas: physical capital, natural capital, human capital,
180 social capital, and economic capital (Chen and Lopez-Carr, 2015; Adger, 2006). The physical
181 capital (D6) covers the characteristics of fishing vessels, with the age of the vessel (in years).
182 A complementary measure of physical capital is based on a combination of length (in meters),
183 engine power (in kW) and tonnage (m^3) expressed in log (Nostbakken et al., 2011; Kirkley et
184 al., 2002).

185 The natural capital (D7) highlights the diversity of fishing activities in the area studied, D7 is
186 represented by two indicators: total number of *métiers*, and diversity of species caught. Human
187 capital (D8) includes the components of the labour factor (Becker, 1975) with two indicators:
188 the age of the fishers and the crew size. Social capital (D9) should allow the avoidance or
189 resolution of conflicts between actors sharing the same space. This domain is represented
190 through vessels registered in the same fishing port, meaning the members from a local
191 community (Holland et al., 2013). Economic capital (D10) refers to an accounting interpretation
192 of the performance of fishing enterprises (European Commission, 2019; National Marine
193 Fisheries Service, 2018). D10 is represented by the annual turnover weighted by the boat
194 characteristics.

195

196

197 **Table 2.** Description of selected indicators used for vulnerability and offshore wind farm
 198 impacts assessment of the fisheries

	Domains	Indicators	Year	Construction of the indicators	Rational / Explanation
D1	Spatial access*	I1	-	Proportion of area accessible to fishing vessel. (in %)	Reduction of fishing area affect income and well-being
D2	Time access*	I2	-	Proportion of the temporal closure accessible to fishing vessel. (in %)	Reduction of fishing time affect the income and well-being
D3	Environmental dependency	I3	2018	Number of species caught in the future wind farm area divided by the total number of species caught in a year. (in %)	Fleets are more sensitive when the diversity of catch observed in the area regarding the total catch needs to be low for low sensitivity
D4	Economic dependency	I4	2018	Annual sales (turnover) made from the area divided by the annual total turnover. (in %)	The income currently made in the area will be lost because the access to the area is restricted in space and time.
D5	Cultural dependency	I5	2018	Frequentation rate of the area by the number of months of activity declared. (in %)	The more frequently (time) they fish in the area the more dependent they are.
		I6	2011 to 2020	Number of years the fishing vessel operated in the area between 2011 and 2020 (in years)	The longer they fish in the area (in years) the harder it will be to change the fishing area
D6	Physical capital	I7	2018	Age of the vessel (in years)	The age of capital is often used as a proxy for the state of capital. The oldest vessels are the least efficient and potentially the least mobile (Guyader and Daurès, 2005).
		I8	2018	Combination of length, engine power and tonnage, transformed into a logarithm (for simplicity of values).	A vessel with a high engine power, length, and storage capacity are more likely to adapt
D7	Natural capital	I9	2018	Number of métiers declared in a year in general (in métier/years)	A high diversity of métiers reflects how fishers can shift target species for both short and long term. The use of these different tools makes it possible to diversify these catches and fish in other area.
		I10	2018	Number of species caught in a year in general (all area included) (in species/years)	The number of species catch gives a hit if they can shift form on species to another. (Guyader et al. 2013) A broader portfolio of target species makes the operators less vulnerable in principle (Aguilera et al., 2015; Morgan, 2016).
D8	Human capital	I11	2018	Age of the boat owner (in years)	The young captains are going to face longer the wind farm making them more vulnerable.
		I12	2018	Crew size (fishers/boat)	The captains have in charge more fishers and it may be more difficult to keep the full effective.
D9	Social capital	I13	2018	Number of vessels from the same fleet per harbor (in vessels/harbor)	Vessels belonging to the same harbour community facilitates exchanges through involvement in the same cooperative and the use of the same partners for the local fish market or technical assistance.
D10	Economic capital	I14	2018	General annual turnover divided by the indicator boat characteristics (D6). (in euros)	It refers to an accounting interpretation of the performance of fishing enterprises (European Commission, 2019; National Marine Fisheries Service, 2018).

199 * Indicators defined by the index developer (the other indicators are provided by Ifremer)

200 **4. Composite index construction**

201 A composite index aims to aggregate several individual indicators to provide a synthetic
 202 measure of a complex, multidimensional system. Based on the method of Hahn et al. (2009),
 203 the construction of the composite index is done in several steps: (1) standardization of data, (2)
 204 average of indicators by domain, (3) definition of weights, (4) aggregation of dimensions and
 205 (5) construction of scenarios (Baptista, 2014; Mazziotta and Pareto, 2013). The description of
 206 the method is presented in annex 1.

207

208 *Step 1:* As the selected indicators have different units (Table 3), a normalization of the data is
 209 carried out based on the Min-Max method (OECD, 2008). This universal normalization
 210 technique provides data with a similar range allowing the data to be placed on a scale of 0 to 1
 211 using the following conversion:

$$212 \quad Y_{X_f} = (X_f - X_{min}) / (X_{max} - X_{min})$$

213 The standard indicator, Y_{X_f} , is calculated from the averaged in indicator X of the fleet f . X_{min}
 214 and X_{max} are the minimum and maximum values possible of the sample including the vessel
 215 of the three fleets. For percentage the scale ranges from the minimum $X_{min}=0\%$ to the
 216 maximum $X_{max}=100\%$. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the indicators grouped by
 217 domain. Averages are given in absolute or relative values with specific units (% , years, log,
 218 euro, number) and in normalized values (\bar{X} norm.) according to step 2 of the method.

219

220 **Table 3:** Indicators selected, \bar{X} = average, CV = coefficient of variation, \bar{X} norm. = average

	Domains	Indicators	Min	Max	Fleet 1		Fleet 2		Fleet 3	
					\bar{X} cv	\bar{X} norm.	\bar{X} cv	\bar{X} norm.	\bar{X} cv	\bar{X} norm.
D1	Spatial access	I1	0	100	100 0	1	100 0	1	100 0	1
D2	Time access	I2	0	100	100 0	1	100 0	1	100 0	1
D3	Environmental dependency	I3	0	100	92.15 0.14	0.92	51.65 0.69	0.51	84.03 0.11	0.84
D4	Economic dependency	I4	0	100	71.26 0.42a	0.71	13.75 1.56	0.14	2.82 0.65	0.03
D5	Cultural dependency	I5	0	100	56.92 0.46	0.56	29.98 0.62	0.29	3.24 0.68	0.02
		I6	1	9	5.56 0.60	0.57	5.19 0.50	0.52	5.15 0.59	0.52
D6	Physical capital	I7	0	48	24.22 0.48	0.50	33.95 0.21	0.71	26.00 0.45	0.54
		I8	7.1	9.7	7.70 0.05	0.20	8.04 0.04	0.33	9.23 0.03	0.80
D7	Natural capital	I9	1	8	4.11 0.42	0.44	5.00 0.35	0.57	2.15 0.26	0.16
		I10	5	70	25.00 0.44	0.31	34.57 0.50	0.45	50.85 0.11	0.71
D8	Human capital	I11	29	80	50.06 0.20	0.41	42,52 0.24	0.27	46.15 0.06	0.34
		I12	1	4,89	1.45 0.42	0.12	1.81 0.27	0.21	4.03 0.09	0.78
D9	Social capital	I13	1	17	9.78 0.76	0.55	7.48 0.93	0.40	13.00 0	0.75
D10	Economic capital	I14	3830	80900	16432 0.70	0.16	16546 0.60	0.16	64642 0.16	0.79

221 Source: original work of the present study

222 *Step 2:* Each domain (D1 to D10) can be calculated from one or two standardised indicators.
 223 To measure the domain for each fleet (Domain_f), the average of all indicators included for each
 224 domain is done, using the sum of the standardized indicators ($Y_{i,f}$) divided by the number of
 225 indicators per domain (n).

$$226 \quad \text{Domain}_f = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n Y_{X_f i}}{n}$$

227 *Step 3:* A different weight can be assigned per domain. In the example presented, the same
 228 weighting is assigned, considering that all domains contribute equally to a particular dimension
 229 (Baptista, 2014). This approach aims to keep the domains on a similar basis, with a weight of 1
 230 (Tate, 2012).

231 *Step 4:* The value of each domain is integrated into one of the three dimensions for each fleet,
 232 using both additive and multiplicative aggregation (Tate, 2012). The literature on composite
 233 index construction methods discusses the unpredicted erroneous interpretations when only one
 234 combination is selected (OECD, 2008; Greco et al., 2019; Blancas et al., 2013). For example,
 235 the Cobb-Douglas production function is based on a multiplicative combination of variables to
 236 demonstrate the returns to scale -increasing, constant, or decreasing-. In other contexts, where
 237 the concept of returns to scale is not required, the additive form is often used. Models of
 238 performance between production units, as the DEA - Data Envelopment Analysis – (Le Floc’h
 239 et Mardle, 2006), are frequently based on additive forms of the selected factors. We select the
 240 two forms of construction of the vulnerability index, additive and multiplicative, at the level of
 241 each domain. The results show that differences between the domains can be significant, but
 242 they compensate each other to give a close reading of the composite vulnerability index.

243

244

245 Additive aggregation: $DV_f = \frac{\sum_{x=1}^k (Domain_f \times Weight_{d,f})}{\sum_{x=1}^k Weight_{d,f}}$

246 Multiplicative aggregation: $DV_f = 1 - \prod_{x=1}^k ((1 - Domain_f) \times Weight_{d,f})$

247 Each measure of the dimension DV =Exposure or Sensitivity, or Adaptive capacity for each
 248 fleet, f , results from the sum of the weighted domain score divided by the sum of the domain
 249 weights. The final step combines the three-dimension scores

$$250 \quad Vulnerability_f = \frac{\left[(Exposure_f + Sensitivity_f - Adaptive\ capacity_f) + 1 \right]}{3}$$


251 This equation gives a spatial vulnerability score for each fleet between 0 and 1. The extreme
 252 situations are 1 for exposure and sensitivity and 0 for adaptive capacity, resulting in the highest
 253 level of vulnerability (=1). On the opposite, a value equal to 0 for exposure and sensitivity and
 254 1 for the adaptive capacity gives a vulnerability score of 0.

255 *Step 5:* The management of fisheries during the construction and operation of the wind farm
 256 can follow a multitude of cases (Fig. 3). The public authorities may allow continued activity in
 257 all areas without time limits. Scenario 1 provides for this first limit case (D1=0 and D2=0), even
 258 though the construction phase necessarily prevents vessels from operating nearby for safety
 259 reasons. This scenario (1) represents the residual vulnerability – the vulnerability the fleet have
 260 even if they can access the area - The other extreme scenario prohibits any operation in the
 261 vicinity of the area all year round. Scenario 7 (initial scenario) simulates this situation, which
 262 is close to the creation of a marine protected area (D1=100 and D2=100), with no or greatly
 263 reduced fishing opportunities (Kriegel et al., 2021; Sala and Giakoumi, 2018). Between these
 264 two limited cases, management authorities have several options. We propose a set of three
 265 simulations (scenarios 2 to 4) with no fishing time limit (D2=0) and a graduated area closure.
 266 In scenario 2, 25% of the area is closed (D1=25). Half of the areas are closed in scenario 3
 267 (D1=50). Finally, three out of four areas are not available in scenario 4 (D1=75). In scenarios

268 5 and 6, boats can use half the space ($D1=50$) or only one out of four areas ($D1=75$) half of the
 269 time ($D2=50$). Other possibilities are possible, without significantly changing the vulnerability
 270 results.

271

272 **Fig. 3.** Scenario for fisheries management in the impacted area



273

274

275 5. Results

276

277 The vulnerability scores provide a first measure that ranks the three fleets. The construction of
 278 scenarios provides a better perspective of the impacts on the vulnerability of the fleets, by
 279 varying the exposure dimension, and the use of two aggregation methods offers a critical result
 280 of the methodology.

281

282 *5.1 Vulnerability scores – initial scenario*

283 Exposure to the impacts generated by the construction of the wind farm requires a total ban on
284 access to fisheries located within the construction zone (scenario 7). With equal exposure for
285 all fishers (exposure = 100), vulnerability depends only on the dimension of sensitivity
286 mitigated by the dimension of adaptive capacity (Table 4).

287 Under the assumption of the additive form, fleet 1 has the highest score ($V_{f1=0.80}$), showing
288 these vessels are the most vulnerable, followed by fleet 2 ($V_{f2=0.66}$) and fleet 3 ($V_{f3=0.58}$). This
289 hierarchy is in line with a basic assumption that small vessels are highly vulnerable due to their
290 lower mobility, and thus lower ability, to shift their fishing effort to other areas.

291 The multiplicative form offers a different reading as fleet 2 ($V_{f2=0.61}$) is less vulnerable than
292 fleet 3 ($V_{f3=0.63}$) with a small difference. We note that the vulnerability score of fleets 1 and 2
293 is reduced when the dimensions are expressed in a multiplicative combination, except for fleet
294 3 as its score increased. Indeed, the sensitivity index and the adaptive capacity index reach
295 higher values under a multiplicative combination. However, the increase in adaptive capacity
296 is too low (the maximum value is reached) for fleet 3 to counteract the sensitivity.

297 The first lesson in the comparison of the two results, additive, and multiplicative forms,
298 concerns the lower scores for the adaptive capacity when the additive form is used. This
299 adaptive capacity is based on a multi-criteria approach to capital, based on five attributes –
300 physical, natural, human, social, economic –.

301

302

303 **Table 4.** Vulnerability score with exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity per fleet in
304 additive and multiplicative forms – scenario 1 (D1=0, D2=0).

Scores	Fleet 1		Fleet 2		Fleet 3	
	<i>additive</i>	<i>multiplicative</i>	<i>additive</i>	<i>multiplicative</i>	<i>additive</i>	<i>multiplicative</i>
Vulnerability (between 0 and 1)	0.80	0.70	0.66	0.61	0.58	0.63
Exposure	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sensitivity	0.73	0.99	0.35	0.75	0.38	0.88
Adaptive capacity	0.34	0.89	0.37	0.91	0.64	1

305

306 *5.2 Vulnerability scores under various fisheries management*

307 Fisheries management scenarios become operational at the end of the wind farm construction
308 phase. While the initial scenario of no fishing is a possibility, the demands of fishers for access
309 to their fishing grounds must be expected. The exposure dimension therefore no longer has a
310 unitary value, depending on the decisions on fisheries management. The approach is similar to
311 marine protected areas methods developed by McCay and Jones (2011) and McClanahan
312 (2010).

313 Without multiplying the alternatives, in complement to the initial scenario, seven cases are
314 presented (Table 5). Each scenario is represented by two values going from 0 to 100 without
315 distinction between the fleet (see Fig. 3).

316 **Table 5:** Vulnerability score of the different fleets under different scenarios; $V_{add.}$ for
317 Vulnerability score in the additive form and $V_{mul.}$ for Vulnerability score in the multiplicative
318 form

Scenarios	Exposure		Fleet 1		Fleet 2		Fleet 3	
	D1 (space)	D2 (time)	$V_{add.}$	$V_{mul.}$	$V_{add.}$	$V_{mul.}$	$V_{add.}$	$V_{mul.}$
Scenario 1 - Residual	0	0	0.46	0.37	0.33	0.28	0.25	0.30
Scenario 2	25	0	0.51	0.45	0.37	0.36	0.29	0.38
Scenario 3	50	0	0.55	0.53	0.41	0.45	0.33	0.46
Scenario 4	75	0	0.59	0.62	0.45	0.53	0.37	0.55
Scenario 5	50	50	0.63	0.62	0.49	0.53	0.41	0.55
Scenario 6	75	50	0.67	0.66	0.54	0.57	0.45	0.59
Scenario 7 - Initial	100	100	0.80	0.70	0.66	0.61	0.58	0.63

319

320 The construction of the different scenarios shows that when the exposition increases the
321 vulnerability increase. Scenario 1 represents the residual vulnerability variate between 0.46 and
322 0.28.


323 The most common aggregation method used in the construction of a composite index for
324 vulnerability assessment is additive (Tonmoy et al., 2014). To test our composite index, we
325 compare both methods, additive, and multiplicative aggregation (Fig 4)).

326 The difference between the two calculation methods is the hierarchy between fleets. The
327 additive approach indicates that fleet 1 is the most vulnerable, followed by fleet 2 and then fleet
328 3. The multiplicative approach confirms that fleet 1 is the most vulnerable, followed by fleet 3.
329 In both cases, the differences in the vulnerability score are constant, whatever the scenario.
330 However, a second difference between the two calculation approaches can be observed when
331 measuring the differences. In the additive form, the vulnerability score of Fleet 1 is increased
332 by 0.14 compared to Fleet 2. Fleet 2 has a higher score of 0.08 compared to Fleet 3. With the
333 multiplicative form, the difference between fleets 2 and 3 is small (a difference of 0.02, stronger
334 for fleet 3).

335 Scenario 4 and 5 display same scores in the multiplicative form with the same exposure $[(1-(1-$
336 $0,75)*(1-0) \Leftrightarrow 1-(1-0,5)*(1-0,5)]$. From the point of view of the implementation of
337 management measures, the two scenarios cannot be considered equivalent. In the first case,
338 fleets are allowed to fish without time limits but in only one out of four areas. In the second
339 scenario, fleets are allowed to fish in two out of four areas but only half of the time.

340

341 **Fig. 4:** Vulnerability score under different scenarios using two aggregation method



342

343

344 5. General discussion

345 *Vulnerability score*

346 All vessels are vulnerable to the establishment of an offshore wind farm at different degrees
 347 and the different scenarios show us an increase in vulnerability as exposure increases. Scenarios
 348 also show us that the vessels present a residual vulnerability even though the exposure is zero.
 349 This is explained by a high sensitivity to the ability to adapt. It is the difference in vulnerability
 350 scores that allows us to understand the different aspects of the socio-ecosystem that need to be
 351 improved to reduce vulnerability. Vulnerability is not a comparison tool but more of a
 352 discussion tool (Hinkel, 2011). Below, the three fleets will be unpacked to better understand
 353 their vulnerabilities.

354 Fleet 1 is more likely to be vulnerable due to a high sensitivity marked by resource dependence
 355 (see table 3), partly explained by the location of the impacted area. Indeed, this zone is located
 356 close to the coast. The coastal zone is used by fishers employing a wide variety of techniques,
 357 mainly low-energy intensive ones (Guyader et al., 2013). For highly dependent fishers, a
 358 reduction in the space exploited is a threat to their income (Van de Geer et al., 2013). Social
 359 consequences can also occur through a loss of cultural attachment (Marshall et al., 2017). These
 360 concepts are difficult to measure but are essential to consider during the negotiation phases to
 361 ensure the acceptability of such a project (Kermagoret et al., 2016). The preservation of fishing

362 activities close to the impact zone is based on a high adaptive capacity, defined by the five
363 domains, all linked to a form of capital (Morgan, 2016). The low levels of the physical and
364 economic capital of coastal vessels are a limit to diversification, reducing the opportunity cost
365 (Smith et al., 2010).

366 Fleet 2 is similar to fleet 1 but with lower economic dependence if the additive form is used.
367 Domains related to forms of capital are distributed differently. In fleet 2, natural capital is based
368 on the greatest number of *métiers* for a wide range of exploited species (intermediate between
369 fleet 1, with the lowest number of species, and fleet 3) (Aguilera et al., 2015). These two small-
370 scale fleets have a lower vulnerability as soon as the access is open to the area. The major issue
371 for decision-makers is the selected criteria for separating small-scale and large-scale vessels.
372 However, the multiplicative form makes the dividing line between small-scale and large-scale
373 fisheries more complex as fleet 2 appears less vulnerable than fleet 3.

374 In our case study, fleet 3 uses active gears (trawling, dredging, or seining techniques). The issue
375 of banning a technique causing strong negative impacts on the ecosystem is plausible (Kraan et
376 al., 2020). Fleet 2 and fleet 3 have the lowest vulnerability due to weak economic dependence.
377 The hierarchical process is inverted according to the additive or multiplicative method, but the
378 results are very close in both cases. Its activities in the impact zone are marginal in economic
379 terms. The site selected for the installation of floating wind turbines is located within the coastal
380 strip, i.e., less than 20 nautical miles from the coastline, offering a sheltered area under bad
381 weather conditions. Oriented towards mass production, fleet 3 depends on specific
382 infrastructure in harbours (Harte et al., 2010). All vessels of fleet 3 belong to the same fishing
383 harbour (D4, social capital). This concentration within a single harbour community facilitates
384 the exchange of information (Rosas et al., 2014). On the one hand, even its low adaptive
385 capacity is sufficient for this fleet to compensate for the expected losses of an area closure in
386 the coastal strip, it can, in principle, seize other fishing opportunities (Gray et al., 2016). On the

387 other hand, its vulnerability may increase if the study considers the impacts on the ecosystem.
388 This is therefore a possible improvement to the vulnerability method by introducing an indicator
389 estimating the negative impact of fishing gear on the ecosystem (sediment, fauna, flora, by-
390 catches, accidental catches).

391

392 *Limitations*

393 The emergence of competition for space between fishing activities and offshore wind farms has
394 led to the exploration of the interactions using the vulnerability method. Adaptation of the
395 method at a local scale requires the definition of the study context (Baptista, 2014; Chen and
396 Lopez-Carr, 2015; Comte et al., 2019). For example, too holistic a definition of the system
397 could be confusing and lead to few applicable results (O'Brien et al., 2004). Therefore, only one
398 pressure was considered here, that of competition for space inside the wind farm area, although
399 other impact factors are also perceived as threats to fishers' activities (climate change, Brexit
400 negotiations, marine pollution, market competition, health crises, etc.) (Bennett et al., 2014).

401 The question of the effectiveness of the method overtime should be addressed. Indeed, unlike
402 conventional indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the vulnerability score
403 represents a possible future. Raoux et al. (2017) show that the conditions of access to the area
404 in time and space by professional fishers have effects not measurable *ex-ante*, on the biomass
405 and its ecosystem. The vulnerability score does not consider the value of the resources around
406 the study area in case of the movement of fleets. The partial or total closure of fishing areas is
407 sometimes equated with the creation of Marine Protected Areas, with an expected positive
408 effect on the abundance of the resource. A potential benefit can only be expected after the
409 construction phase of an offshore wind farm has been completed (Punt et al., 2009). To account

410 for the effects obtained following the implementation of a wind farm, the vulnerability
411 assessment will need to be updated regularly.

412

413 The vulnerability assessment is based on the construction of a composite index resulting from
414 the prior identification of impacts and adaptive capacity. The selected indicators and a specific
415 weight must be adapted to the issues raised by the fishers in interviews before the project is
416 implemented (Islam et al., 2014). In the most favourable case of the existence of databases on
417 threatened communities, the choice of indicators should be based on their relevance rather than
418 their availability (Barnett et al., 2008). This justifies the creation of domains informed by a
419 single indicator. In this study equal weights are assigned. However, Engle (2011) shows that
420 indicators do not contribute equally to vulnerability and empirically derived weights should be
421 used. More interaction with stakeholders using interviews needs to be done to attenuate this
422 parameter.

423 The comparison between the two-aggregation method shows limits in the construction of the
424 composite index if only one combination (additive or multiplicative) is used (Fig. 4). The issue
425 with arithmetic and geometric mean approaches is that they assume a monotonic/ linear
426 relationship between indicator and vulnerability and thus disregard potential nonlinearities and
427 thresholds in this relationship (Tonmoy et al., 2014).

428 Due to the presented limit of the method, it is important to understand that vulnerability is a
429 theoretical concept based on a composite index that cannot be measured in the same way as a
430 mass of an object or an income obtain at the end of the month (OECD, 2008). To avoid
431 misinterpretation, it is fundamental to not only base the discussion on the vulnerability score
432 itself but also the score of dimensions and domains (Hinkel, 2011).

433

434 *5.3 Advantages and application of the method*

435 Applying the vulnerability assessment method to a local scale offers many advantages. It offers
436 high flexibility of implementation at a low cost, subject to access to pre-existing databases.
437 Used as a communication tool for discussion between stakeholders at each stage of the project,
438 the local vulnerability assessment produces a single score based on three dimensions, the
439 degrees of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity as a mitigation factor (Thiault et al.,
440 2019; O'Brien et al., 2004).

441 Without putting this approach in competition with spatial optimisation models, one of the
442 advantages of the vulnerability assessment is the place given to indicators relating to non-
443 market values. The cultural attachment manifested by fishers is collected in at least three areas
444 of the model: cultural dependence (through the number of years of activity in the area), human
445 capital as a factor measuring experience, and social capital being equated with harbour
446 communities.

447 The vulnerability assessment allows constructions of scenarios (O'Brien et al. 2004; Hahn et al
448 2009). The choice of scenarios depends on the objectives of the management (Blyth-Skyrme,
449 2011) and the aim of the community (in a social and economic aspect) regarding this area based
450 on discussion with stakeholders, considering environmental and technological developments
451 (Hinkel, 2011). Indeed, offshore wind farm projects are subject to technological breakthroughs
452 that may modify the initial format by the number of machines installed. The area of occupation
453 may vary overtime before the final decision on location is made. Environmental factors are also
454 subject to other pressure factors that can change the stakes for fishers. The recommendation
455 resulting from this research concerns an updated measure of vulnerability at each key moment
456 of the negotiation stage to favour the social acceptance of a wind-energy project, often
457 described as a threat to the sustainability of traditional fishing activities.

458

459 **6. Conclusion**

460 This research focuses on adapting the vulnerability method, often applied to climatic impact
461 factors, to a question of spatial cohabitation in the coastal strip. The context chosen was that of
462 spatial competition between a traditional activity, the exploitation of living marine resources
463 by fishers, and the development of a new industry, marine renewable energy at sea. As its
464 purpose is to reduce the costs of negotiations between stakeholders in a marine area that has
465 multiple uses (fisheries, wind or tidal turbine sites, aquaculture basins, species conservation
466 sites, recreational uses, etc.) the vulnerability assessment deserves to be widely applied to
467 different situations of this kind.

468 The paper follows the method of composite index construction using two approaches, additive
469 and multiplicative. The results focus on the vulnerability score by comparing the initial scenario
470 with no fishing area and fishing time limits with scenarios of activity limitation in space and
471 time. A future step is collaborative research with fishers and all stakeholders concerned by the
472 impact area, indicating the limits of the method if only one form of calculation (additive or
473 multiplicative) is preferred.

474

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480

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483

484

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Appendix A: Calculation of the Human capital, domain of the dimension adaptive capacity for the composite index assessing vulnerability of fishing activity regarding the implementation of a future offshore wind farm.

	Mean fleet1	Min value for study population	Max value for study population	Standardized value for fleet 1	Human capital component value for fleet 1
D8 Age of fishers	50.06	29	80	0.41	0.26
D8 Crew size	1.45	1	4.89	0.12	

Step 1: (repeat for all indicators): $Y_{X_f} = (X_f - X_{min}) / (X_{max} - X_{min})$, example:
 $Y_{age\ of\ fisher, fleet1} = \frac{(50.06-29)}{(80-29)} = 0.41$

Step 2: (repeat for all domain): $Domain_f = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n Y_{X_{fi}}}{n}$, example: Human capital_{fleet1} = $\frac{(0.41+0.12)}{2} = 0.26$

Step 3: (repeat for all dimension)

using additive aggregation $DV_f = \frac{\sum_{x=1}^k (Domain_f \times Weight_{d,f})}{\sum_{x=1}^k Weight_{d,f}}$,

example $Adaptive\ capacity_{fleet1} = \frac{(0.35 \times 1) + (0.38 \times 1) + (0.26 \times 1) + (0.55 \times 1) + (0.16 \times 1)}{1+1+1+1+1} = 0.34$

using multiplicative aggregation: $DV_f = 1 - \prod_{x=1}^k ((1 - Domain_f) \times Weight_{d,f})$

example $Adaptive\ capacity_{fleet1} = 1 - ((1 - 0.35) \times 1) \times ((1 - 0.38) \times 1) \times ((1 - 0.26) \times 1) \times ((1 - 0.55) \times 1) \times ((1 - 0.16) \times 1)$

Step 4: (repeat for all fleet): $Vulnerability_f = \frac{[(Exposure_f + Sensitivity_f - Adaptive\ capacity_f) + 1]}{3}$,

Example using the result of the additive aggregation

$Vulnerability_{fleet1} = \frac{[(1 + 0.73 - 0.34) + 1]}{3} = 0.80$