| Type |
Article |
| Date |
2017-06 |
| Language |
English |
| Author(s) |
Frangoudes Katia1, Bellanger Manuel2 |
| Affiliation(s) |
1 : Univ Brest, CNRS, IFREMER, UMR 6308,AMURE,IUEM, F-29280 Plouzane, France.
2 : Univ Brest, CNRS, IFREMER, UMR 6308,AMURE,Unite Econ Maritime,IUEM, F-29280 Plouzane, France. |
| Source |
Marine Policy (0308-597X) (Elsevier Sci Ltd), 2017-06 , Vol. 80 , P. 107-112 |
| DOI |
10.1016/j.marpol.2017.01.010 |
| WOS© Times Cited |
9 |
| Keyword(s) |
ITQs, Quota allocation, Small-scale fisheries |
| Abstract |
After many years of Common Fisheries Policies in the European Union, 88% of stocks are still being fished beyond their Maximum Sustainable Yield. While several Member States and the European Commission are moving toward Individual Transferable Quotas as a solution, France has declared its opposition to such marketization of fishing access rights and a national law has classified fisheries resources as a collective heritage. This paper discusses the evolution of the French system, principally its distribution of access rights by the Producer Organizations instead of the market. However, the Producer Organizations, which are more linked to the industrial fleet organizations, have not always modified their sharing formulae to include small-scale fisheries, resulting in a demand for more transparency and equity. |
| Full Text |
| File |
Pages |
Size |
Access |
|
6 |
154 KB |
Access on demand |
| Author's final draft |
14 |
330 KB |
Open access |
|
