Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution

Type Article
Date 2015
Language English
Author(s) Guillen Jordi1, 2, Macher ClaireORCID1, Merzereaud Mathieu1, Boncoeur Jean3, Guyader Olivier1
Affiliation(s) 1 : IFREMER, UMR AMURE, Unite Econ Maritime, F-29280 Plouzane, France.
2 : CSIC, Inst Ciencies Mar, E-08003 Barcelona, Spain.
3 : Univ Brest, UMR AMURE, IUEM, F-29238 Brest 3, France.
Source Marine Resource Economics (0738-1360) (Univ Chicago Press), 2015 , Vol. 30 , N. 2 , P. 123-138
DOI 10.1086/679970
WOS© Times Cited 10
Keyword(s) Remuneration systems, share remuneration, lay system, MSY, MEY, open access, bioeconomic modeling, nephrops
Abstract Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.
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Guillen Jordi, Macher Claire, Merzereaud Mathieu, Boncoeur Jean, Guyader Olivier (2015). Effects of the Share Remuneration System on Fisheries Management Targets and Rent Distribution. Marine Resource Economics, 30(2), 123-138. Publisher's official version : https://doi.org/10.1086/679970 , Open Access version : https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00260/37086/